Release v0.31.0 — report parity + the inverted rescue (0.29.0 → 0.31.0) #40

Merged
serversdown merged 31 commits from dev into main 2026-09-18 16:46:45 -04:00
2 changed files with 358 additions and 0 deletions
Showing only changes of commit c6fc3d0241 - Show all commits
+224
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,27 @@ This runbook describes how to break the loop and recover control.
---
## ⚠ There are TWO failure modes under "wedged unit"
Same root cause — an offset/connector fault drives the geophone above trigger,
the unit records back-to-back, ACH set to "after event recorded" dials
constantly — but the *recovery* differs, because the thing blocking you is
different.
| | **BE9558H (2026-05)** | **BE12599 (2026-09)** |
|---|---|---|
| What blocks you | Modem mode-flipping kills inbound TCP | Device never enters S3 mode at all |
| Device state | Alive, in S3 mode, responsive once reached | Stuck repeating an **AT modem-init** string, deaf to S3 |
| Fix direction | **Inbound** — clear Destination, slow-drip a Stop | **Inverted** — point Destination at our own ACH server and let the unit call *us* |
| Winning tool | `scripts/slow_drip.sh` | `bridges/ach_server.py --stop-monitoring` |
**Tell them apart with the ALEOS serial log** (see "Turn on ALEOS_SERIAL debug"
below). If the device is emitting `ATQ1/ATE0/ATS0=2` every ~75 s, it is in the
BE12599 mode and **no amount of inbound work will reach it** — skip to
"Second incident" below.
---
## Symptoms
- Terra-View / SFM `/device/info` either hangs or fails on `count_events()`.
@@ -253,3 +274,206 @@ service).
Total time from "i was wondering if its possible to" first attempt to
recovery: ~7 hours of intermittent debugging across one evening.
---
# Second incident — BE12599, 2026-09-16/17
**Unit:** BE12599 at `166.246.64.226:9034`, RV50, job *I-80 North Fork Bridge
— Abut 1 West* (Fay Company). Same job as BE9558H, which is a coincidence.
**Fault:** the connector fault documented in `docs/offset_investigation.md`
§8e progressed until the Tran pedestal reached **0.400 in/s** — its trigger
level. Constant triggering → constant recording → ACH "after event recorded"
→ continuous dialing. Same disease as BE9558H.
**But the recovery was the opposite direction**, and none of the Step 1–4
procedure above worked. Total time ≈ 5 h, of which ~90 min was spent on two
red herrings documented below.
---
## Turn on ALEOS_SERIAL debug FIRST
This is the single highest-value diagnostic and it should be step zero on any
future incident. ACEmanager → **Admin → Log → ALEOS_SERIAL log level →
DEBUG**, then view the serial log.
It is the only thing that tells you what the *device* is actually saying.
Everything before we did this was guesswork.
## What the log showed — the device was never in S3 mode
Every ~75 seconds, verbatim:
```
ALEOS_SERIAL_HIF: 29 byte(s) in buffer: 'ATQ1^MATE0^MATS0=2^M^MRADIO RING^M'
ALEOS_SERIAL_HMC: TCP recvhost fd 65535 len 29 state TCPMode::kClosed
ALEOS_SERIAL_HMC: tcpmode trying to send to invalid socket
ALEOS_SERIAL_HMC: Connect to IP: 0.0.0.0 Port 0
ALEOS_SERIAL_HMC: Initialize Auto answer on port 9034
ALEOS_SERIAL_HMC: Cannot connect to 0.0.0.0
```
Read that carefully:
- `ATQ1` (quiet) / `ATE0` (echo off) / `ATS0=2` (auto-answer after 2 rings).
**There is no `ATD`.** The device is not dialing — it is trying to
*configure* its modem.
- The modem's serial port is in TCP data mode, so it never interprets these
as AT commands. It treats them as payload and tries to ship them to a TCP
socket that does not exist.
- The device therefore never receives `OK`, never progresses, and **retries
the identical 29 bytes forever**.
**Consequence: the device is not running the S3 protocol parser.** You can
land a byte-perfect S3 frame on it and it will be ignored. This is why every
inbound approach failed, and it is the structural difference from BE9558H.
### Why `slow_drip` lied
`slow_drip` returned the *success* signature except for the one field that
mattered:
```json
{"duration_s":120.0,"drips_sent":38,"bytes_sent":920,
"bytes_received":0,"send_error":null}
```
Full duration, no broken pipe — but zero bytes back. Cause is in the log
above: each 75 s cycle re-runs `Initialize Auto answer on port 9034`, which
orphans the held session (`data in for unknown reason 3 removing from
select`, `OnMsg recv error: 107 - Transport endpoint is not connected`). Our
local TCP stayed open so `sendall` never raised — but the modem stopped
bridging after the first re-init, so every drip after that went into a socket
nobody was reading.
⚠ **`send_error: null` + full duration is NOT success. Only
`bytes_received > 0` is success.**
---
## ⚠ Two red herrings that cost ~90 minutes
### 1. The trusted-IP whitelist (this was the real reason inbound never worked)
The RV50s run with **Security → Trusted IPs (Friends List) enabled**. A
source IP that is not on the list is dropped **silently** — inbound presents
as `Connection error: timed out`, never a refusal.
Brian's dev-box public IP is **dynamic** and had changed, so `tmi-dev` was no
longer whitelisted. Every inbound attempt failed identically across four
different modem and device states, which looked exactly like the BE9558H
mode-flipping symptom and sent us chasing modem configuration for over an
hour.
**Check this before diagnosing anything else.** Note that SFM in Docker
egresses via the *host's public IP*, not its LAN IP.
### 2. A 502 from SFM does not mean TCP connected
`sfm/server.py` raises **502 for both** failure classes:
```python
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Protocol error: {exc}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Connection error: {exc}")
```
We read an early 502 as "TCP connected, modem bridged, device mute" and built
a whole theory on it. It was almost certainly a connect timeout.
**Always read the `detail` string** — "connect failed" and "device didn't
answer" are completely different problems and the status code will not
separate them.
---
## What actually worked — invert the direction
The key observation is in the log above:
> `TCP recvhost ... state TCPMode::kClosed` → `Connect to IP: 0.0.0.0 Port 0`
**The modem auto-dials its Destination whenever serial data arrives while
closed.** So instead of fighting for inbound, give it somewhere to dial:
point `Destination Address` at our own `ach_server` and the device's own
75-second attempts become **device-initiated sessions the modem bridges
correctly**. No race, no contention, worst case a 75-second wait.
### Procedure
1. **Run the rescue server** on a host the modem can reach (public IP +
forwarded port):
```bash
cd /home/serversdown/seismo-relay
.venv/bin/python -u bridges/ach_server.py --port 12345 \
-o bridges/captures/<unit>-diag --stop-monitoring -v
```
2. **Point the modem at it** — ACEmanager → Serial → Port Configuration →
`Destination Address` = your public IP, `Destination Port` = 12345.
3. **Wait for the call-in.** `--stop-monitoring` fires SUB 0x97 at step 1.5,
after the handshake and *before* the event walk. Confirm via
`rescue.json` in the session directory:
```json
{"peer": "166.246.64.226:60921", "stop_monitoring": "ok"}
```
4. **Restore the modem's Destination** once you are done, then finish the
device side (disable ACH, erase) through whichever channel works.
On BE12599 the first call-in landed at 20:58:11 and reported
`stop_monitoring: ok`; a second at 20:58:20 confirmed it. `is_monitoring:
false` was still true **6½ hours later** — the fix is durable.
---
## Hard-won gotchas (do not re-derive)
- **Never leave the Destination pointed at a host with nothing listening.**
That is the worst state available: the device still dials, the modem still
flips, inbound stays blocked, and nothing is delivered. An 8-minute gap
with the listener down produced a spurious inbound timeout that cost
another round of misdiagnosis.
- **Stopping monitoring removes your call-in channel.** ACH is "after event
recorded"; no new events means no new dials. The backlog sitting in memory
does *not* re-arm it. After a successful stop the unit goes quiet and you
need the modem cycled (works — produced a call-in), the scheduled daily call
(BE12599 calls at **05:00:14 device-local**, per §8e), or working inbound.
**Plan the order before you fire the stop.**
- **`--events-only` silently breaks dedup.** It skips the device-info step,
so the serial is never read; `ach_state.json` then keys on
`peer:ephemeral_port`, which is unique per connection. Every session looks
like a new unit, starts from key 0, and re-downloads the same event. Four
sessions on BE12599 downloaded the identical event four times and made zero
progress on the backlog. Events also file as `serial=UNKNOWN` with a
`M000…` BW filename (serial_numeric 0) instead of `N599…`.
**Do not use `--events-only` when you intend to download anything.**
- **`/device/events/index` reported `lifetime_count: 0`** on a unit with years
of history. Suspected decode bug in the SUB 0x08 field offset — do not
trust that number. The 88-byte payload is preserved in the `raw_hex` field
if someone wants to chase it.
- **Memory used cross-checks the event keys exactly:**
`last_key − buffer_start = memory_total − memory_free`. On BE12599:
`0x011230ec − 0x01110000 = 78,060` and `983,028 − 904,968 = 78,060`.
Useful sanity check that you are reading the keys right.
---
## Final state (2026-09-17 ~01:30 local)
- `is_monitoring: false`, held 6½ hours
- Battery 6.76 V
- Memory 78,060 / 983,028 bytes used (8%)
- `first_key 01121728`, `last_key 011230ec` — ~6.6 KB of addressable event
chain, roughly 3 events
- ACH still **enabled** — to be disabled after the backlog is preserved
- Modem Destination still pointed at tmi-dev — to be restored
- ⚠ **Do not re-enable ACH until the connector is serviced.** Tran is still
sitting at 0.400 and the loop restarts the moment monitoring resumes.
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
# Plan — "Rescue Listener": a first-class tool for the inverted rescue
**Status:** proposal, not started. Written 2026-09-17 ~01:40 local, straight
off the BE12599 incident. Open questions at the bottom need Brian's answer
before anything is built.
**Background:** `docs/runbooks/wedged_unit_recovery.md`, "Second incident —
BE12599". The manual version of this worked; this plan is about making it a
tool instead of a sequence of remembered steps at 1 AM.
---
## The problem, stated plainly
When a unit is wedged in the BE12599 mode — geophone offset above trigger,
recording back-to-back, ACH dialing constantly, device stuck repeating an AT
modem-init string and therefore **deaf to S3 over inbound** — the only channel
that works is the one the *device* opens.
Recovering it currently means:
1. Remember that `bridges/ach_server.py` exists and takes the right flags
2. Start it by hand on a box the modem can reach, with a public port forwarded
3. Go into ACEmanager and repoint the modem's Destination
4. Watch a terminal for a call-in
5. Read `rescue.json` to find out whether it worked
6. Go back into ACEmanager and repoint the modem to where it belongs
7. **Not forget step 6**, because leaving the Destination pointed at a dead
listener is worse than never having started
That is six manual steps and one landmine, executed under pressure while a
unit floods the office server.
## What the tool should be
**A "rescue listener" an operator can start for one unit, which handles
whatever that unit says when it calls in, and refuses to go away until the
operator confirms the modem has been pointed back.**
Lifecycle:
1. **Start** — operator names the target unit and starts a rescue listener.
The tool reports the exact address/port to enter in ACEmanager, plus the
actions it will take.
2. **Operator repoints the modem** to that address.
3. **Wait** — listener sits there. Live status: "waiting for call-in",
elapsed, last-seen.
4. **Act** — on call-in, run the configured rescue actions automatically,
in a safe order, each independently guarded. Report per-action outcome.
5. **Hold** — the listener **stays up** and keeps reporting, because the
modem is still pointed at it.
6. **Confirm & stop** — the operator explicitly confirms the Destination has
been restored (to `0.0.0.0`, or to the office Instantel ACH server).
Only then does the listener shut down.
Step 6 is the whole point of making this a tool. It is the step that is
easiest to skip and most expensive to skip.
## Default action set
Ordered deliberately — see "order matters" below.
| # | Action | Default | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | **Stop monitoring** (SUB 0x97) | ✅ on | Halts recording; ends the trigger→record→dial loop at its source. Already implemented as `--stop-monitoring`. |
| 2 | **Drain events** to a diagnostics store | ⚙ configurable | The backlog is usually evidence, not garbage — see the BE12599 offset investigation. Must NOT land in the prod SFM DB. |
| 3 | **Disable ACH** (SUB 0x2C/0x7E/0x7F) | ❌ off by default | Stops the dialing — **and stops your only channel**. Opt-in, and ideally gated on step 1 having succeeded. |
| 4 | **Erase events** | ❌ off by default | Destructive. Only after a verified drain. |
### Order matters — the lesson from BE12599
Stopping monitoring *removes the call-in trigger*. ACH fires on "after event
recorded"; with recording stopped, the unit has no reason to dial again, even
though the backlog is still sitting in its memory. So a naive
"stop + disable + erase, all at once" rescue can silence the unit before
you've collected anything, leaving you with no channel and a device full of
evidence.
The tool should either sequence around this or warn loudly about it. My
instinct is: **stop monitoring immediately** (it's the bleeding), then drain
across however many call-ins it takes, and treat disable-ACH/erase as a
separate, explicit "finish" action once the operator is satisfied.
## Where it should live — open question, with a proposal
The natural tier is **SFM** (device-side, per the three-tier model in
CLAUDE.md). But the rescue listener must be reachable *from the cellular
network*, which is a deployment constraint SFM's usual profile doesn't have.
**Proposal worth considering:** run it at the office, beside the real Instantel
ACH server, on a **different port** (e.g. 12346 while Instantel holds 12345).
Then the ACEmanager change is a **port change, not an IP change** — smaller,
faster, less to get wrong, and trivially reversible. It also means the office
public IP (already stable and known) is the destination, rather than whatever
Brian's dynamic home IP happens to be that week.
The tmi-dev approach used on BE12599 worked, but required a router forward and
ran into the dynamic-IP problem in the same session.
## Open questions
1. **Where does it run?** Office beside Instantel ACH (port swap), SFM on the
NAS, or ad-hoc on tmi-dev? Affects everything else.
2. **What drives it?** Terra-View admin page (fits "operator UI"), an SFM
endpoint pair (`POST /device/rescue_listener/start` + `/stop` + `/status`),
or a CLI wrapper? A long-lived listener doesn't fit the request/response
endpoint shape well — probably needs a background task with a status poll.
3. **How does it identify the unit?** It can't know the serial until the
device calls in and the handshake reads it. Allowlist by modem IP? Accept
anything and report what showed up?
4. **Where do drained events go?** A per-incident diagnostics store
(`bridges/captures/<unit>-diag`) seems right — explicitly *not* the prod
SFM DB. Does that store need to be a first-class thing with its own
retention, or is a directory fine?
5. **How is "confirm the modem is repointed" verified?** Operator attestation
(a button), or can we actually probe it? If the listener stops seeing
call-ins that's weak evidence; if inbound to the unit starts working that's
stronger.
6. **Multi-unit?** One listener per incident, or one listener that handles any
unit that dials in? Probably the former for safety.
7. **Timeout / abandonment policy.** If nobody ever confirms, does it run
forever? Alert after N hours?
## What already exists
- `bridges/ach_server.py` — the listener itself, with `--stop-monitoring`,
`--disable-ach`, `--rescue` (added on `feat/ach-rescue-on-connect`, commit
`9f1050b`), `--clear-after-download`, `--max-events`, `--allow-ip`.
- Per-session `rescue.json` recording per-action outcomes.
- Isolated per-output-dir SQLite + waveform store, so a diagnostics capture is
already separate from prod by construction.
So the gap is not protocol work — it's lifecycle, operator surface, and the
confirmation gate. Most of the risk is in questions 1 and 2.