fix(portal): pre-merge security hardening from code review
- PORTAL_OPEN_LINKS now defaults OFF — /portal/open/* is an unauthenticated, proxy-reachable session-minting path (and a linked project's open link grants the whole client's scope), so it must be explicitly enabled in dev. - Session cookie: enforce server-side expiry (check iat vs COOKIE_MAX_AGE — was browser-only) and guard a non-dict signed body (was an uncaught AttributeError → 500, reachable if SECRET_KEY is the insecure default). - Escape operator-set strings (location/rule/event names) before innerHTML + Leaflet tooltips — they're client-facing, so a name with markup was stored XSS in the client's browser. Global esc() helper applied at every injection point. - WS _scrub_frame drops a non-JSON frame instead of forwarding it raw; /history rows now whitelisted like the other scoped endpoints. - Preview-client slug uses the full project id (an 8-char prefix could collide two projects onto one client). Verified: cookie reader (fresh/expired/non-dict/missing-iat) + open-links default off; templates parse; scoped scrubbing intact. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -179,6 +179,8 @@
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<script>
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// Theme toggle. Pages can listen for 'portal-theme' to re-skin canvases/maps.
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function cssVar(n) { return getComputedStyle(document.documentElement).getPropertyValue(n).trim(); }
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// HTML-escape operator-set strings (location/rule names) before innerHTML/tooltip injection.
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function esc(s) { return String(s == null ? '' : s).replace(/[&<>"']/g, c => ({ '&': '&', '<': '<', '>': '>', '"': '"', "'": ''' }[c])); }
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function togglePortalTheme() {
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const cur = document.documentElement.getAttribute('data-theme') === 'light' ? 'light' : 'dark';
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const next = cur === 'light' ? 'dark' : 'light';
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