Files
terra-view/backend/portal_auth.py
T
serversdown fe7cf91488 fix(portal): pre-merge security hardening from code review
- PORTAL_OPEN_LINKS now defaults OFF — /portal/open/* is an unauthenticated,
  proxy-reachable session-minting path (and a linked project's open link grants
  the whole client's scope), so it must be explicitly enabled in dev.
- Session cookie: enforce server-side expiry (check iat vs COOKIE_MAX_AGE — was
  browser-only) and guard a non-dict signed body (was an uncaught AttributeError →
  500, reachable if SECRET_KEY is the insecure default).
- Escape operator-set strings (location/rule/event names) before innerHTML +
  Leaflet tooltips — they're client-facing, so a name with markup was stored XSS
  in the client's browser. Global esc() helper applied at every injection point.
- WS _scrub_frame drops a non-JSON frame instead of forwarding it raw; /history
  rows now whitelisted like the other scoped endpoints.
- Preview-client slug uses the full project id (an 8-char prefix could collide
  two projects onto one client).

Verified: cookie reader (fresh/expired/non-dict/missing-iat) + open-links default
off; templates parse; scoped scrubbing intact.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 23:40:52 +00:00

184 lines
7.2 KiB
Python

"""
Client-portal auth — the swappable gate (see docs/CLIENT_PORTAL.md).
M1-M3 ride on an interim signed "magic URL": an unguessable token in the link
mints a signed session cookie. Every portal route depends on get_current_client();
M4 replaces the backing (magic-link / accounts) without touching routes/templates.
The cookie carries the ACCESS-TOKEN id (not the client id) and is re-validated
against the DB on every request, so revoking a link (revoked_at) kills its live
sessions on the next request — not just future clicks.
No new dependency: the cookie is signed with stdlib HMAC-SHA256 over a SECRET_KEY.
"""
import os
import hmac
import json
import time
import uuid
import base64
import hashlib
import logging
import secrets
from datetime import datetime
from fastapi import Request, Depends
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from backend.database import get_db
from backend.models import Client, ClientAccessToken
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Signing secret for portal session cookies. MUST be set to a real secret in prod
# (env). The insecure default only exists so dev/test boots without config.
SECRET_KEY = os.getenv("SECRET_KEY", "dev-insecure-change-me")
if SECRET_KEY == "dev-insecure-change-me":
logger.warning("[PORTAL] SECRET_KEY is the insecure default — set SECRET_KEY in prod.")
COOKIE_NAME = "portal_session"
COOKIE_MAX_AGE = 60 * 60 * 24 * 30 # 30 days
# Plain, no-token portal links (/portal/open/{project_id}). These are an
# UNAUTHENTICATED, proxy-reachable session-minting path (and a linked project's
# open link grants the *whole* client's scope), so they default OFF and must be
# explicitly enabled — set PORTAL_OPEN_LINKS=true only in a dev/prototype env.
PORTAL_OPEN_LINKS = os.getenv("PORTAL_OPEN_LINKS", "false").lower() in ("1", "true", "yes")
if PORTAL_OPEN_LINKS:
logger.warning("[PORTAL] open links ENABLED — no-token /portal/open/* shareable links. "
"Keep this OFF in any internet-facing / production deployment.")
class PortalAuthError(Exception):
"""Raised by get_current_client when there's no valid portal session.
Handled centrally in main.py: HTML routes get the access-required page,
/portal/api/* routes get a 401 JSON."""
# -- token + cookie primitives ----------------------------------------------
def hash_token(raw: str) -> str:
"""sha256 hex of a raw access-token secret (what we store + look up by)."""
return hashlib.sha256(raw.encode()).hexdigest()
def _sign(body: str) -> str:
return hmac.new(SECRET_KEY.encode(), body.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def make_session_cookie(token_id: str) -> str:
body = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
json.dumps({"tid": token_id, "iat": int(time.time())}).encode()
).decode()
return f"{body}.{_sign(body)}"
def _read_session_cookie(value: str):
"""Return the token id from a signed cookie, or None if missing/tampered."""
try:
body, sig = value.rsplit(".", 1)
except (ValueError, AttributeError):
return None
if not hmac.compare_digest(sig, _sign(body)):
return None
try:
data = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(body.encode()))
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return None
# Server-side expiry: a leaked cookie isn't valid forever (max_age is only a
# browser hint). iat is set by make_session_cookie.
iat = data.get("iat")
if not isinstance(iat, (int, float)) or (time.time() - iat) > COOKIE_MAX_AGE:
return None
return data.get("tid")
except Exception:
return None
# -- the dependency every portal route uses ---------------------------------
def client_from_cookie(cookie_value, db: Session):
"""Resolve a Client from a raw session-cookie value, or None. Re-validates the
access token against the DB each call, so a revoked link / disabled client
drops immediately. Shared by the HTTP dependency and the WebSocket handler
(which can't use Request-based Depends)."""
token_id = _read_session_cookie(cookie_value) if cookie_value else None
if not token_id:
return None
tok = db.query(ClientAccessToken).filter_by(id=token_id, revoked_at=None).first()
if not tok:
return None
return db.query(Client).filter_by(id=tok.client_id, active=True).first()
def get_current_client(request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -> Client:
"""Resolve the authenticated client, or raise PortalAuthError."""
client = client_from_cookie(request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME), db)
if client is None:
raise PortalAuthError()
return client
def resolve_token(raw_token: str, db: Session):
"""Validate a raw magic-URL token. Returns (ClientAccessToken, Client) on
success, or (None, None). Also stamps last_used_at."""
tok = db.query(ClientAccessToken).filter_by(
token_hash=hash_token(raw_token), revoked_at=None
).first()
if not tok:
return None, None
client = db.query(Client).filter_by(id=tok.client_id, active=True).first()
if not client:
return None, None
tok.last_used_at = datetime.utcnow()
db.commit()
return tok, client
def ensure_project_client(project, db) -> Client:
"""Find or create the Client for a project. Reuses the project's linked client
if it has one; otherwise creates/uses a per-project 'preview-<id>' client and
sets project.client_id (only when unset, so it never clobbers a real link)."""
client = None
if project.client_id:
client = db.query(Client).filter_by(id=project.client_id, active=True).first()
if client is None:
slug = f"preview-{project.id}" # full id — an 8-char prefix can collide across projects
client = db.query(Client).filter_by(slug=slug).first()
if client is None:
client = Client(id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
name=(project.client_name or project.name or "Preview"),
slug=slug, active=True)
db.add(client)
db.flush()
if not project.client_id:
project.client_id = client.id
return client
def mint_link_token(client, db, label=None) -> str:
"""Mint a fresh access token for a client and return the RAW secret (caller
builds the /portal/enter/<raw> URL and shows it once). Only the hash is stored."""
raw = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
db.add(ClientAccessToken(id=str(uuid.uuid4()), client_id=client.id,
token_hash=hash_token(raw), label=label))
db.commit()
return raw
def provision_preview_session(project, db) -> str:
"""Operator preview shortcut: ensure a Client + access token exist for a project
and return a token id to seal into a session cookie (no shared link). Reuses an
existing token so repeat previews don't accumulate clutter; the raw secret is
discarded (preview rides the cookie)."""
client = ensure_project_client(project, db)
tok = db.query(ClientAccessToken).filter_by(client_id=client.id, revoked_at=None).first()
if tok is None:
tok = ClientAccessToken(id=str(uuid.uuid4()), client_id=client.id,
token_hash=hash_token(secrets.token_urlsafe(32)),
label="preview")
db.add(tok)
db.commit()
return tok.id