merge: Series-4 live client -- framing, protocol and read client, verified on hardware

The Series-4 live half of SFM: micromate/{framing,protocol,client}.py with 98
offline tests, driven against two real units over both physical transports.

Read-only throughout.  No command has ever been originated against a unit by
this project -- every write in the protocol reference was performed by THOR
while we recorded, and keeping that true through the read client is deliberate.

Six errors in docs/micromate_client_spec.md were found by measuring against the
captures before writing code rather than after.  All six fail silently:

  * requests need FOUR escaped bytes, not one (161/218 frames without)
  * the response checksum is plain SUM8, not the DLE-aware variant (55/251)
  * SUB 0x5A is a 1024-byte chunk loop, not one request per event
  * SUB 0x0A is the monitor-log walk, not a keyed event-header read
  * 1E/1F carry token 0xFE at params[7]
  * SUB 0x01 has no THOR precedent at all

Hardware verification: identical wire bytes over USB CDC-ACM and an RX55 in PAD
mode; every 11.0BD inference confirmed on UM20147; a monitoring unit answers
reads with no SESSION_RESET; and all six bench events decode with the existing
IDF codec.

Two findings that constrain SFM's design rather than just documenting a unit:
cellular costs ~0.65 s PER ROUND TRIP regardless of payload, and event keys
COLLIDE ACROSS UNITS, so any store must key on (serial, event_key).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ru8Lg9HkkYvX9VWWo65SmL
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-30 14:31:23 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
13 changed files with 4066 additions and 55 deletions
+52 -3
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@@ -10,10 +10,38 @@ pair — lives in `../terra-view/docs/tmi-stack.md`, which is also loaded as
---
## Where things stand (updated 2026-08-28)
## Where things stand (updated 2026-09-26)
Read this first when picking the project back up.
- **The Series-4 LIVE wire protocol is reverse-engineered end to end
(2026-09-25).** `docs/micromate_protocol_reference.md` is the Series-4
Rosetta Stone, sibling to `instantel_protocol_reference.md`. **A Micromate
answers Series III command frames** — three framing differences: responses
have **no leading `DLE`** (a bare `STX`), `payload[1]` is `0xC5` (Blastware
firmware) or `0x03` (Thor firmware) rather than `0x10`, and the data length
is a **uint16 BE at `payload[8:10]`** (as a byte it under-reads `SUB 0x1A`
by 47x). Read path, event chain, setups, scheduler, monitoring control and
per-event delete are all mapped; **the inbound call-home session is the only
protocol unknown left.**
⚠ **No command has ever been originated against a unit by this project.**
Every write was performed by THOR while we recorded. That line is worth
keeping.
⚠ `micromate/` still has **no live client** — it is codec-only. The
`minimateplus/` stack (transport/framing/protocol/client) has no Series-4
counterpart yet. `minimateplus.transport` is protocol-agnostic and reusable.
- **Bench tooling for device diagnosis (2026-09-25).** `bridges/mm_probe.py`
distinguishes the four faults THOR reports identically as "disconnected"
(refused / connect timeout / **connected but no reply** / replied) and names
what to try next. `bridges/mm_link.py` is a stand-in for a cellular modem
with a decoded log and fault injection. `scratch/mm_frame_parse.py` exists
because **`S3FrameParser` cannot see Micromate responses at all** — it scans
for `DLE+STX`, which never appears in Series-4 traffic.
- **A Micromate's USB-A host port drives FTDI and CDC-ACM only** — no Prolific,
in either firmware line. TMI buys both Sabrent (FTDI) and Benfei (PL2303)
cables and they are indistinguishable by eye. A PL2303 cable leaves a unit
with **no working modem port at all**; identify by `lsusb` VID, `0403` vs
`067b`. This accounted for a unit that could not be deployed.
- **Series-3 decode is verified per-sample at scale (v0.27.0).** The full DL2
archive decodes **14,338 / 14,338** paired files exactly against their
preserved Blastware ASCII exports — 1,249 waveform + 13,089 histogram, 45
@@ -92,6 +120,9 @@ Read this first when picking the project back up.
**v0.27.0 does NOT owe prod a backfill** — verified: the partial-final-block
fix changes 0 of the 10,215 histograms in the prod store (the 4 recovered
files are archive-only and were never ingested).
✅ **The v0.30.0 Series-4 backfill HAS been run on prod (2026-09-25).** Every
stored Series-4 geophone value was ~3.3% low until then; that is corrected and
the job does not need repeating.
- **The "offset" hardware fault has its own journal** --
`docs/offset_investigation.md`. **5 of 45 units (11%)**, and the fault is
**persistent** — it stays until the geophone is serviced. Detect it with
@@ -103,7 +134,18 @@ Read this first when picking the project back up.
`SUB 0x0E` (unimplemented), which may carry those very numbers.
When new information about the protocol is discovered, please update the instantel_protocol_reference.md with the findings in addition to this document
When new information about a protocol is discovered, record it in the matching
reference **in addition to** this document:
| series | document |
|---|---|
| Series III (MiniMate Plus / BlastMate) | `docs/instantel_protocol_reference.md` |
| **Series IV (Micromate / THOR)** | **`docs/micromate_protocol_reference.md`** |
| Thor IDF file format | `docs/idf_protocol_reference.md` |
Both protocol references carry retractions in place rather than deleting what
turned out to be wrong — that convention has already saved re-deriving the same
mistakes twice, so keep it.
---
@@ -276,8 +318,15 @@ minimateplus/ ← Python client library (primary focus)
sfm/server.py ← FastAPI REST server exposing device data over HTTP
seismo_lab.py ← Tkinter GUI (Bridge + Analyzer + Console tabs)
bridges/
mm_probe.py ← name the fault behind a dead unit (4 verdicts, read-only)
mm_link.py ← bench stand-in for a cellular modem, with fault injection
ach_mitm.py ← TCP relay for recording a Series-3 ACH session
docs/
instantel_protocol_reference.md ← reverse-engineered protocol spec ("the Rosetta Stone")
instantel_protocol_reference.md ← Series III protocol spec ("the Rosetta Stone")
micromate_protocol_reference.md ← Series IV protocol spec + THOR's measured behaviour
idf_protocol_reference.md ← Thor IDF file format
CHANGELOG.md ← version history
```
+363
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@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
mm_client_check.py — exercise the Micromate read client against a real unit.
**Read-only.** It sends POLL, SERIAL, state, monitor status, the setup walk and
(optionally) one event download. It never writes, never erases, never starts or
stops monitoring.
Why it exists
-------------
`micromate/{framing,protocol,client}.py` are verified against captures taken
**over USB**, on **one firmware line** (`11.0CB`). Two things that cannot be
verified that way:
* **the modem path.** An RX55/RV55 bridges serial to TCP transparently, but
it buffers up to ~1 s before forwarding, so a single logical response can
arrive as many small reads. The client reads to frame completion rather
than using idle-gap detection, which should be strictly more robust — but
"should be" is the point of this script.
* **the other firmware line.** `11.0BD` reports `flags = 0x03`, a shorter
model string, and a `SUB 0x1C` block 4 bytes longer. Everything about that
is currently inference from one 2026-09-23 sweep whose captures never
landed in the repo.
Run it over both paths and diff the two reports. Anything that differs beyond
timings is a finding.
Usage
-----
# over the modem
python3 bridges/mm_client_check.py 63.45.161.30:9034
# over USB / direct serial
python3 bridges/mm_client_check.py /dev/ttyACM0 --baud 115200
# include one event download (still read-only)
python3 bridges/mm_client_check.py <target> --download
⚠ These modems bridge ONE TCP session to serial at a time. If THOR holds the
unit, this will connect and then see nothing — that is contention, not a fault.
`bridges/mm_probe.py` explains that case; disconnect THOR first.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import errno
import os
import select
import sys
import termios
import time
from pathlib import Path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from micromate.client import MicromateClient, _content # noqa: E402
from micromate.protocol import ProtocolError # noqa: E402
from minimateplus.transport import TcpTransport # noqa: E402
class StdlibSerial:
"""Raw serial on stdlib `termios` — no pyserial.
`minimateplus.SerialTransport` needs pyserial, and a bench host is whatever
is to hand. On a PEP 668 distro (Mint 22, Ubuntu 24.04, Debian 12) a plain
`pip install pyserial` is refused outright, so a diagnostic that depends on
it is one you cannot run at the moment you need it. `bridges/mm_link.py`
and `scratch/fake_unit.py` already take this approach; this is the same
~30 lines, and it means the tool runs on a stock Python 3 anywhere.
Not a general replacement for SerialTransport — no flow control, no
parity options, Linux/macOS only. Enough for a Micromate, which is 8N1
with no handshaking.
"""
_BAUD = {9600: termios.B9600, 19200: termios.B19200, 38400: termios.B38400,
57600: termios.B57600, 115200: termios.B115200}
def __init__(self, path: str, baud: int = 115200) -> None:
if baud not in self._BAUD:
raise ValueError(f"unsupported baud {baud}; pick from {sorted(self._BAUD)}")
self.path, self.baud, self.fd = path, baud, None
def connect(self) -> None:
if self.fd is not None:
return
self.fd = os.open(self.path, os.O_RDWR | os.O_NOCTTY | os.O_NONBLOCK)
a = termios.tcgetattr(self.fd)
a[0] = a[1] = a[3] = 0 # raw in/out, non-canonical
a[2] = termios.CS8 | termios.CREAD | termios.CLOCAL # 8N1, ignore modem lines
a[4] = a[5] = self._BAUD[self.baud]
a[6] = list(a[6])
a[6][termios.VMIN] = 0
a[6][termios.VTIME] = 0
termios.tcsetattr(self.fd, termios.TCSANOW, a)
termios.tcflush(self.fd, termios.TCIOFLUSH)
def disconnect(self) -> None:
if self.fd is not None:
os.close(self.fd)
self.fd = None
def is_connected(self) -> bool:
return self.fd is not None
def read(self, n: int) -> bytes:
if self.fd is None:
return b""
r, _, _ = select.select([self.fd], [], [], 0.05)
if not r:
return b""
try:
return os.read(self.fd, n)
except OSError as e:
if e.errno in (errno.EAGAIN, errno.EWOULDBLOCK):
return b""
raise
def write(self, data: bytes) -> None:
if self.fd is None:
raise OSError("port is not open")
while data:
data = data[os.write(self.fd, data):]
class _Timed:
"""Count bytes and time each read, so the two transports can be compared.
With `capture`, also writes the raw byte streams to a `raw_bw_*` /
`raw_s3_*` pair in the layout `scratch/mm_frame_parse.py` already reads --
so a run on an unfamiliar unit can be turned into test fixtures without
setting up a relay.
"""
def __init__(self, inner, capture: str | None = None) -> None:
self._inner = inner
self.reads = 0
self.bytes_in = 0
self.bytes_out = 0
self._bw = self._s3 = None
if capture:
stamp = time.strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S")
d = Path(capture)
d.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.bw_path = d / f"raw_bw_{stamp}_mm_client_check.bin"
self.s3_path = d / f"raw_s3_{stamp}_mm_client_check.bin"
self._bw = open(self.bw_path, "wb")
self._s3 = open(self.s3_path, "wb")
def close_capture(self) -> None:
for f in (self._bw, self._s3):
if f:
f.close()
def connect(self):
return self._inner.connect()
def disconnect(self):
return self._inner.disconnect()
def is_connected(self):
return self._inner.is_connected()
def write(self, data: bytes):
self.bytes_out += len(data)
if self._bw:
self._bw.write(data); self._bw.flush()
return self._inner.write(data)
def read(self, n: int) -> bytes:
chunk = self._inner.read(n)
if chunk:
self.reads += 1
self.bytes_in += len(chunk)
if self._s3:
self._s3.write(chunk); self._s3.flush()
return chunk
# ⚠ HYPOTHESIS, 6 events. content[11] of the 0x0C record separated 4 waveforms
# from 2 histograms cleanly and was constant within each group. A 4/2 split is
# thin evidence for a byte that could be anything, so _decode() below does NOT
# trust it -- it tries the other suffix on failure and says when the guess was
# wrong. The protocol reference states no type field is known; this may be it.
_TYPE_BYTE = 11
_TYPES = {0x07: ".IDFW", 0x08: ".IDFH"}
def _event_type(record: bytes) -> str:
if len(record) <= _TYPE_BYTE:
return "?"
b = record[_TYPE_BYTE]
return {0x07: "waveform", 0x08: "histogram"}.get(b, f"unknown(0x{b:02x})")
def _decode(blob: bytes, key: bytes, record: bytes) -> None:
"""Decode the downloaded bytes, proving they are a real event file.
read_idf_file() picks waveform vs histogram from the FILENAME SUFFIX, and a
wire download has no filename -- so the suffix has to come from somewhere.
This tries the 0x0C type byte first and the other suffix second; getting a
decode either way proves the chunk assembly, and which one worked is itself
the finding.
"""
import tempfile
from micromate.idf_file import read_idf_file
guess = _TYPES.get(record[_TYPE_BYTE] if len(record) > _TYPE_BYTE else -1, ".IDFW")
order = [guess] + [e for e in (".IDFW", ".IDFH") if e != guess]
for n, ext in enumerate(order):
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=ext, delete=False) as f:
f.write(blob)
tmp = f.name
try:
res = read_idf_file(tmp)
samples = sum(len(v) for v in getattr(res, "samples", {}).values())
note = "" if n == 0 else f" *** the 0x0C type byte guessed {guess} — WRONG ***"
print(f" decoded OK as {ext}: {samples} samples{note}")
os.unlink(tmp)
return
except Exception as e:
last = f"{ext}: {type(e).__name__}: {e}"
finally:
if os.path.exists(tmp):
os.unlink(tmp)
print(f" decode failed BOTH ways — last: {last}")
out = Path(f"./{key.hex()}.bin")
out.write_bytes(blob)
print(f" saved to {out} for offline analysis")
def step(label: str, fn):
"""Run one read, report how long it took and what it returned."""
t0 = time.monotonic()
try:
value = fn()
except Exception as e:
print(f" {label:.<26} FAILED {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
return None
ms = 1000 * (time.monotonic() - t0)
shown = value if isinstance(value, str) else repr(value)
if isinstance(value, list):
shown = f"{len(value)} entries"
print(f" {label:.<26} {ms:7.0f} ms {shown}")
return value
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter
)
ap.add_argument("target", help="host:port for TCP, or a serial device path")
ap.add_argument("--baud", type=int, default=115200,
help="serial only; the USB-A/FTDI path runs at 115200. "
"Ignored by the USB-B 'PC' port, which is CDC-ACM "
"and negotiates its own rate.")
ap.add_argument("--timeout", type=float, default=10.0)
ap.add_argument("--download", action="store_true",
help="also download the first stored event (read-only)")
ap.add_argument("--capture", metavar="DIR",
help="also write a raw_bw_*/raw_s3_*.bin pair to DIR, so "
"this run can become a test fixture. Worth doing on "
"any unit whose firmware line is new to us.")
ap.add_argument("--lenient", action="store_true",
help="do not raise on a bad checksum — for diagnosis only")
a = ap.parse_args()
if ":" in a.target and not Path(a.target).exists():
host, _, port = a.target.rpartition(":")
inner = TcpTransport(host, int(port), connect_timeout=a.timeout)
path = f"TCP {host}:{port}"
else:
inner = StdlibSerial(a.target, baud=a.baud)
path = f"serial {a.target} @ {a.baud}"
transport = _Timed(inner, capture=a.capture)
mm = MicromateClient(transport, recv_timeout=a.timeout,
strict_checksums=not a.lenient)
print(f"\n{path} (read-only: POLL, SERIAL, state, status, setups)\n")
t0 = time.monotonic()
try:
mm.open()
except OSError as e:
print(f" connect.................... FAILED {e}")
return 2
print(f" {'connect':.<26} {1000*(time.monotonic()-t0):7.0f} ms")
try:
info = step("connect() identity", mm.connect)
if info:
print(f" serial={info.serial} model={info.model} "
f"fw={info.firmware_line} monitoring={info.monitoring}")
print(f" active setup={info.active_setup!r}")
if info.firmware_line == "thor":
print(" *** 11.0BD unit — the FIRST one this code has met. ***")
print(" *** Check the battery and clock below carefully: ***")
print(" *** its 0x1C block is 4 bytes longer. ***")
state = step("get_state()", mm.get_state)
if state:
print(f" {state}")
if state.battery_volts and not 2.5 < state.battery_volts < 9.0:
print(f" *** battery {state.battery_volts} V is impossible — "
f"this is the from-the-end offset bug. ***")
if state.device_time is None:
print(" *** device clock did not decode — dump raw below. ***")
print(f" raw 0x1C content: {_content(state.raw).hex(' ')}")
setups = step("list_setups()", mm.list_setups)
if setups:
print(f" first={setups[0]!r} last={setups[-1]!r}")
if a.download:
print("\n event chain (read-only):")
proto = mm.protocol
proto.arm_event()
hdr = _content(proto.read_event_first())
key, size = hdr[0:4], int.from_bytes(hdr[4:8], "big")
if not size:
print(" no events stored")
else:
rec = _content(proto.read_event_record(key))
print(f" first event key={key.hex()} size={size} B "
f"type={_event_type(rec)}")
t1 = time.monotonic()
blob = proto.read_event_file(key, size)
dt = time.monotonic() - t1
print(f" downloaded {len(blob)} B in {dt:.1f} s "
f"({len(blob)/dt/1024:.1f} KiB/s)")
assert len(blob) == size
_decode(blob, key, rec)
except ProtocolError as e:
print(f"\n ABORTED {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
return 3
finally:
mm.close()
transport.close_capture()
if a.capture:
print(f"\n capture written:\n {transport.bw_path}\n {transport.s3_path}")
print(" parse it with: python3 scratch/mm_frame_parse.py "
f"{transport.bw_path} {transport.s3_path}")
elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0
print(f"\n transport: {transport.reads} reads, "
f"{transport.bytes_in} B in, {transport.bytes_out} B out, "
f"{elapsed:.1f} s total")
print(" Measured 2026-09-29, UM12947, same unit both ways:")
print(" USB-B (CDC-ACM) 83 reads list_setups 0.46 s download 394 KiB/s")
print(" RX55 (TCP) 36 reads list_setups 16.05 s download 1.6 KiB/s")
print(" The modem needs FEWER reads, not more -- it buffers ~1 s and then")
print(" forwards one large segment, where CDC-ACM delivers many small ones.")
print(" Cost is ~0.65 s PER ROUND TRIP regardless of payload size, so what")
print(" matters over cellular is the number of commands, not the bytes.\n")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
+23 -10
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@@ -134,17 +134,30 @@ def probe(host: str, port: int, timeout: float) -> int:
step(2, "POLL", f"NO REPLY in {timeout:.1f} s")
print("\nverdict: the MODEM answered but the unit did not.")
print(" TCP is fine end to end — something accepted the connection.")
print(" What is missing is the serial side. Most likely the modem is")
print(" not forwarding to its serial port, which is what a wedged")
print(" transparent-TCP session looks like: the slot is held by a")
print(" connection that never closed.")
print(" What is missing is the serial side. Two quite different")
print(" causes produce this, and they are NOT distinguishable from")
print(" here:")
print("\n 1. SOMEONE ELSE HOLDS THE SESSION. These modems bridge ONE")
print(" TCP session to serial at a time. A second connection is")
print(" accepted and then simply not forwarded. Confirmed 2026-09-26:")
print(" with THOR connected this probe saw exactly this; the moment")
print(" THOR disconnected the same probe returned the serial number.")
print(" ** Check whether THOR (or anything else) has the unit first. **")
print("\n 2. The serial path is genuinely broken — a stale session the")
print(" modem never released, a cable the unit cannot enumerate, or")
print(" a unit that is off.")
print("\n Try, in order:")
print(" 1. ACEmanager -> TCP Idle Timeout. If 0/disabled, a stale")
print(" session holds the slot forever. 2 minutes is the value")
print(" this project standardised on.")
print(" 2. Reboot the modem. If that fixes it, the modem was")
print(" holding state and the timeout is the permanent fix.")
print(" 3. Check the unit's own screen — serial cable, power.")
print(" 1. Disconnect any other client and re-probe. If it answers,")
print(" it was contention, not a fault.")
print(" 2. The cable's chipset. A Micromate drives FTDI and CDC-ACM")
print(" only — a Prolific PL2303 gives it no serial port at all.")
print(" lsusb: FTDI is 0403, Prolific 067b.")
print(" 3. Power-cycle the UNIT with the cable attached (hold power")
print(" 5 s, through the two-stage prompt). Its USB host rescans")
print(" on cold boot; it may not on hot-swap.")
print(" 4. AirLink OS -> TCP Idle Timeout. If 0/disabled, a stale")
print(" session holds the slot indefinitely. 2 minutes is the")
print(" value this project standardised on.")
sock.close()
return 5
+408
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@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
# Spec — a live client for Series IV (Micromate)
Drafted 2026-09-26, ahead of implementation. The protocol work is finished; this
is the plan for turning `docs/micromate_protocol_reference.md` into code SFM can
run.
**Read that document first.** Everything here assumes it, and every constant
below is sourced from it rather than restated with justification.
---
## Goal and scope
`micromate/` is codec-only today — `idf_file.py`, `models.py`, the report
writers. There is no way to talk to a unit. This adds the live half, mirroring
`minimateplus/`.
**In scope, first pass:**
- connect over TCP (a field modem) or serial/USB (a bench unit)
- identify a unit, read its state, clock, memory and setups
- walk the event chain and download events
- return `Event` objects the existing codec already understands
**Explicitly out of scope, first pass:**
- ⚠ **Any write.** Setups, schedules, call-home config, monitoring start/stop,
and per-event delete are all mapped, and none of them will be implemented
here. **No command has ever been originated against a unit by this project**
— every write observed was performed by THOR while we recorded. Keeping that
true through the read client is deliberate: it means the first thing we ever
send to a customer's instrument is a decision someone made on purpose, not a
side effect of a client that happened to grow a method.
- the inbound call-home session — still the one protocol unknown
---
## Layout
```
micromate/
framing.py NEW frame building, response parsing, checksum
protocol.py NEW one method per wire command, returns raw payloads
client.py NEW high-level API, returns models
idf_file.py (existing — decodes what 0x5A returns, unchanged)
models.py (existing — extend, do not fork)
```
**Transport is reused, not rewritten.** `minimateplus/transport.py` is
byte-level and protocol-agnostic — `BaseTransport`, `SerialTransport`,
`TcpTransport`, plus `read_until_idle()` which already handles the RV50/RV55
habit of emitting `\r\nRING\r\n\r\nCONNECT\r\n` to a caller. Import it.
⚠ Do **not** import `minimateplus.framing`. The two framings differ in ways
that look small and are not, and a shared module would accumulate `if series ==`
branches until neither case is readable.
---
## `micromate/framing.py` — ✅ BUILT 2026-09-27
Implemented, with `tests/test_micromate_framing.py` (31 tests, all passing).
**Two things in this section as originally drafted were wrong**, and both were
caught by measuring against the captures before writing code rather than after.
They are left in place below, struck through, because both are the kind of
mistake that would be made again.
### Requests
~~Series IV accepts Series III request frames unmodified. The simplest correct
implementation re-exports the builder rather than duplicating it:~~
```python
from minimateplus.framing import build_bw_frame # ✗ WRONG — 161/218
```
⚠ **`build_bw_frame` reproduces only 161 of Thor's 218 captured read frames.**
The payload layout is identical; the stuffing is not. A Micromate escapes
**four** byte values — `0x02`, `0x03`, `0x04`, `0x10` — where Series III
escapes one. The frames this breaks are **every `SUB 0x5A` download**
(`offset = 0x0400` → a literal `0x04` in `offset_hi`) and the scheduler enable.
An unescaped `0x03`/`0x04` terminates the frame early, so the unit just does not
answer.
`build_request()` with the correct escape set reproduces **218/218**.
✅ **Settled: `0x10` inside params needs no special handling.** The planned
`NotImplementedError` guard is unnecessary — Thor sends
`params = 00 00 10 00 …` on `SUB 0x5A` in five captured frames and the wire
carries an ordinary doubled `10 10`. One rule covers the whole payload.
### Responses — where Series III's parser cannot follow
| | Series III | Micromate |
|---|---|---|
| frame start | `DLE STX` | **bare `STX`** |
| `payload[1]` | `0x10` | `0xC5` (Blastware fw) / `0x03` (Thor fw) |
| destuffing | `DLE+ETX` kept as literal inner-frame data | **`10 XX` → `XX`, uniformly** |
The first row is why `S3FrameParser` returns nothing at all on Series IV traffic:
it scans for `DLE+STX`, which never appears.
The third is a genuine **simplification** — no inner-frame carve-out. Validated
by checksum across every capture in `bridges/captures/9-24-26 - micromate2/`:
four candidate destuffing rules were tried, and only this one makes all frames
validate.
### Checksum
```python
def checksum(payload: bytes) -> int:
return sum(payload) & 0xFF # payload already de-stuffed
```
~~The DLE-aware variant, same as Series III's `5A` and write frames.~~
⚠ **Plain SUM8, not the DLE-aware variant** — 251/251 both directions. The
DLE-aware form is the right answer paired with *Series III* de-stuffing, which
leaves an escaped byte in the payload as two bytes. De-stuffing `10 XX → XX`
already removes the `0x10`, so excluding it again subtracts the correction
twice, and the result disagrees with the wire on **55 of 251** captured
responses — every frame holding a literal `0x10`.
`scratch/mm_frame_parse.py` shipped with exactly that pairing. It looked clean
only because it accepts a frame matching *either* rule, so it labelled those 55
`SUM8` and never flagged one bad. "Zero bad checksums" was true and carried no
information. Fixed there too.
### ⚠ The SUB byte can be escaped
When a SUB's value is `0x02`, `0x03`, `0x04` or `0x10` it arrives as `10 XX`.
Reading it positionally without destuffing reports `0x10`. This bit once
already — `SUB 0x02` was logged as `SUB_10` for an afternoon. Destuff first,
then index.
### Response shape
```python
@dataclass
class MicromateFrame:
sub: int # response SUB; request = 0xFF - sub
flags: int # 0xC5 Blastware line, 0x03 Thor line
page_hi: int
page_lo: int
data: bytes # payload[5:], checksum stripped
checksum_valid: bool
@property
def request_sub(self) -> int: # 0xFF - sub
@property
def page_key(self) -> int: # uint16 BE at payload[3:5]
@property
def firmware_line(self) -> str: # "blastware" | "thor" | "unknown"
@property
def probe_length(self) -> int | None: # uint16 BE at data[3:5] (= payload[8:10])
```
⚠ **`probe_length` is a uint16 BE.** Read as a single byte it under-reads
`SUB 0x1A` by 47x — 44 against a true 2092. This is the single most expensive
mistake available in this protocol and it has already been made once.
Renamed from `declared_length`, because it is **only meaningful in the reply to
an `offset = 0` probe** — and Thor never probes. Across all 251 captured
responses the field reads 0 or a page count, never a length, precisely because
that session is single-step reads throughout. `page_key` is the field that
carries meaning there. The only genuine probe reply we hold is the POLL one
preserved in `scratch/fake_unit.py`.
`MicromateFrameParser` mirrors `S3FrameParser`: `feed(bytes) -> list[frame]`,
accumulates in `.frames`, `reset()`, and keeps the `bytes_fed` counter (it is
what distinguishes "no bytes at all" from "bytes but no complete frame" on a
timeout, and that distinction earned its keep during the Series III work).
---
## `micromate/protocol.py` — ✅ BUILT 2026-09-27
Implemented, with `tests/test_micromate_protocol.py` (35 tests). Reads only;
nothing here writes, erases or changes monitoring state.
The tests replay Thor's captured responses through a scripted transport and
assert **the bytes we emit are the bytes Thor emits** — including a full replay
of the six-event download session, all 56 `0x5A` frames byte-for-byte. That is
a stronger guarantee than "our parser understands the device": a passing test
means a real unit has already answered exactly that frame.
One method per command, returning raw payload bytes. No interpretation — that
belongs in `client.py`.
**Reads use `offset = 0xFFFF`** and return the whole block in one response;
Series III's two-step probe/data dance is unnecessary. `POLL` is the exception,
taking its data length. Per-command offsets, all observed:
| command | SUB | rsp | offset | returns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| poll | `0x5B` | `0xA4` | `0x0030` | device string, model |
| serial | `0x15` | `0xEA` | `0x000A` | `UM12947` |
| device info | `0x01` | `0xFE` | `0xFFFF` | firmware, calibration |
| state | `0x49` | `0xB6` | `0xFFFF` | `data[11]`: non-zero = monitoring |
| monitor status | `0x1C` | `0xE3` | `0xFFFF` | flag, **device clock**, battery, memory |
| storage range | `0x06` | `0xF9` | `0xFFFF` | event storage extent |
| active setup name | `0x41` | `0xBE` | `0xFFFF` | `TEST1.mmb` |
| first setup | `0x3F` | `0xC0` | `0xFFFF` | setup-list walk head |
| next setup | `0x40` | `0xBF` | `0xFFFF` | …until an empty name |
| compliance config | `0x1A` | `0xE5` | `0xFFFF` | ~2103 B setup block |
| call-home config | `0x2C` | `0xD3` | `0xFFFF` | 137 B |
| arm event | `0x93` | `0x6C` | — | before every event |
| first event | `0x1E` | `0xE1` | `0xFFFF` | key + size |
| next event | `0x1F` | `0xE0` | `0xFFFF` | key + size |
| event record | `0x0C` | `0xF3` | `0xFFFF` | 221 B — project, location, peaks |
| ~~event header~~ **monitor log** | `0x0A` | `0xF5` | `0xFFFF` | ⚠ 297 B, a **walk** — see below |
| bulk download | `0x5A` | `0xA5` | computed | **the `.IDFW` verbatim**, 1024 B at a time |
⚠ **Corrected 2026-09-27, from Thor's frames.** Three rows of the table above
were wrong or incomplete, and the last one is a different command than labelled:
- **`0x0A` is the monitor-log walk**, not a keyed "30 B list record" read. The
*same request repeated* returns successive 297-byte records — serial, mode,
thresholds — until an 11-byte ack ends the list. The device holds the cursor;
nothing in the request selects a record. Series III reaches this data through
a record-type discriminator on its event chain; here it has its own cursor and
the event chain never sees it.
- **`0x1E`/`0x1F` carry token `0xFE` at `params[7]`.** The reference documents
all-zero params (our own probing, which also worked). Thor's form is the one
with mileage.
- **`0x01` has no Thor frame behind it** — it is never read in any captured
session. Its `0xFFFF` comes from our probes.
And one useful negative: **no `SESSION_RESET` (`41 03`)**. Series III needs that
2-byte signal or a monitoring unit will not answer `POLL` over TCP. Thor never
sends it — zero occurrences across 8 sessions, including 40 frames exchanged
with a unit that *was* monitoring.
⚠ **`SUB 0x1C` is 4 bytes longer on the Thor firmware line** (`0x30` vs `0x2C`).
Parse **forward** from `declared_length`, never backward from the end — Series
III reads battery and memory from the end of that block, and doing so on a BD
unit yields a battery voltage of **577.92 V**.
⚠ **Test the monitoring flag for non-zero**, never against a constant. It has
read both `0x0E` and `0x0C` while monitoring.
### `0x5A` — a bounded chunk loop, and much simpler than Series III
⚠ **Corrected 2026-09-27.** This section said "no chunk loop — one request
returns the whole event", with `offset_word = 0x1000 + 2 * ceil(size / 512)`.
That describes our own 2026-09-23 probes, which set `offset_hi = 0x10`. **Thor
chunks**, and Thor's form is the one verified from bytes on disk:
```python
n = ceil(size / 1024) # size from the chain walk
for i in range(n):
offset = min(1024, size - 1024 * i) # a BYTE COUNT
params = key4 + bytes(6) if i == 0 else bytes(2) + pack(">H", 1024*i) + bytes(6)
file_bytes += response.data[11:] # response data is exactly offset + 11
```
Verified on all six bench events (4,076 → 13,424 B): `sum(offsets) == size`
exactly, with the predicted chunk count and final offset every time.
Still no arming ritual for `0x5A` itself, no `STRT` end-offset parsing and no
`TERM` frame — the simplification the original claim celebrated is real, it just
is not single-shot. (`SUB 0x93` arms the *chain walk*, before `1E`/`1F`, not
the download.)
The concatenated payload **is** the `.IDFW` file, byte for byte — so it feeds
`micromate.idf_file.read_idf_file()` and `/db/import/idf_file` unchanged.
⚠ Do not port the Series III `5A` walk. Its address arithmetic caused a 5x
over-read and a `> 64 KB` page-boundary bug that is *still open* on the Series
III side. None of that applies here: the chunk index is a byte offset into the
file, bounded by a size the device told us, and it cannot run past the event.
⚠ **`assert sum(len(chunk) - 11 for chunk in chunks) == size`.** A silently
short event is the failure mode this project has been bitten by repeatedly on
the Series III side, and here the check is free because the size is known up
front.
---
## `micromate/client.py` — ✅ BUILT (read half) 2026-09-27
`connect()`, `get_state()`, `get_active_setup()`, `list_setups()` plus
`MicromateDeviceInfo` / `MicromateState` in `models.py`. 26 tests, every
response constant a real captured data section.
⚠ **`connect()` is deliberately narrower than this spec asked for.** The spec
said to mirror Thor's `POLL → SERIAL → 0x49 → POLL` "because it is known-good".
Measurement showed the four-command form is Thor's *connection check*, present
in 3 of 8 sessions, and its fourth frame repeats its first — so `connect()`
sends the three reads that gather something. `0x01` is not read at all: Thor
never reads it, its layout is unmapped, and `firmware_line` comes free from any
response's flags byte.
Event-chain methods (`list_events`, `download_event`, `get_event`) are step 4
and not yet written; `MicromateProtocol.read_event_file()` already does the
download.
```python
class MicromateClient:
def __init__(self, transport: BaseTransport): ...
def open(self) / close(self) / is_open(self)
# identity and state
def connect(self) -> DeviceInfo # poll → serial → device info → state
def get_state(self) -> UnitState # monitoring?, clock, battery, memory
def get_active_setup(self) -> str
def list_setups(self) -> list[str] # 0x3F → 0x40… until empty
# events
def list_events(self) -> list[EventRef] # 0x93 → 0x1E → 0x1F… (key + size)
def download_event(self, ref) -> bytes # raw .IDFW/.IDFH
def get_event(self, ref) -> Event # download + decode via idf_file
```
`connect()` should mirror THOR's preamble (`POLL → SERIAL → 0x49 → POLL`) —
⚠ but note the reference records that **whether the unit requires it is
untested**. Do it because it is known-good, not because it is known-necessary,
and say so in the docstring.
`list_events()` returns the key *and* the size, because `download_event()` needs
the size to compute its offset word.
---
## Tests
**Offline, from captured bytes — no hardware.** This is the part worth doing
first, because it can be fully verified tonight's-captures-style before any unit
is involved.
```
tests/test_micromate_framing.py
```
⚠ `bridges/captures/` and `tests/fixtures/` are both gitignored, so tests must
not depend on files being present. **Embed the frames as hex constants** — they
are 19–138 bytes each. ✅ Done; what actually landed:
| case | source | why |
|---|---|---|
| POLL probe reply, 19 B | captured (via `fake_unit.py`) | shortest valid frame; the only real probe reply we hold |
| `0x5A` chunk, 138 B | captured | holds literal `0x10` **and** literal `0x41` — the checksum case, and proves ACK is not escaped |
| `0x49` state reply, 25 B | captured | a literal `0x02`, escaped |
| `0x48` file reply, 24 B | captured | escaped `0x04` in `data[0]` — one byte late without destuffing |
| 8 Thor request frames | captured | byte-for-byte against `build_request()`, incl. both `0x5A` forms and the scheduler enable |
| `probe_length = 0x082C` | **synthesised** | no probe reply for `0x1A` exists on disk — the 9-24-26 session never probes |
| Thor-line reply, `flags = 0x03` | **synthesised** | no 11.0BD capture is in the repo; built by flipping one byte of the real POLL reply |
| escaped checksum byte | **synthesised** | the shortest real one is 1,070 B, too long to embed for one assertion |
| truncated / corrupt / split-across-feeds | derived | parser must return nothing, flag rather than swallow, and survive any split point |
⚠ Synthesised frames are marked `SYNTH_`-style in the test and each says what it
stands in for and why no capture was available. Do not let that set grow
quietly: the `flags = 0x03` case in particular is the **only** coverage of half
the fleet, and it deserves a real 11.0BD capture the next time UM20147 is on a
bench.
Two corpus-backed tests run when the captures happen to be on the box and skip
cleanly otherwise: **251 response frames parse with zero bad checksums**, and
**`build_request()` reproduces 218/218 read frames**. The second is the test
that would have caught the escape-set error, so it is worth the skip marker.
⚠ Do **not** assert against `scratch/mm_frame_parse.py`'s output as the original
plan proposed. That script accepts either checksum rule and is wrong about
which one is right — using it as an oracle would have pinned the bug.
**Live, second:** against the bench unit on mint-mac via `mm_link.py`.
`connect()`, `list_setups()` (should return the 23 known names), `list_events()`,
then `download_event()` and assert the bytes decode and match a
`/db/import/idf_file` ingest of the same event.
---
## Order of work
1. ✅ `framing.py` + its tests — **done 2026-09-27**, 31 tests, offline
2. ✅ `protocol.py` + its tests — **done 2026-09-27**, 35 tests, offline
3. ✅ `client.py` + its tests — **done 2026-09-27**, 26 tests, offline
4. the event chain and `download_event()`
5. decode end-to-end and compare against a store event
Steps 1–2 need no hardware at all.
**Worth carrying forward.** Both steps began by measuring against the captures
rather than trusting this document, and both found errors in it — three in the
framing rules (the escape set, 26% of frames; the checksum, 22%; the `0x5A`
chunk model) and three more in the command table (`0x0A`'s meaning, the
`1E`/`1F` token, `0x01`'s provenance). All six fail quietly. The captures are on
disk and a measure-then-write loop costs about two minutes per rule, so keep
doing it for `client.py`'s field offsets — and treat this spec as a plan, not a
source.
---
## Open questions to settle while implementing
- ~~**Request param stuffing**~~ — ✅ settled 2026-09-27; no special handling.
- **Is the single-request `0x5A` form real?** Our 2026-09-23 probes set
`offset_hi = 0x10` and appeared to get a whole 11 KB event back, where Thor
chunks at 1024 B. Plausibly a distinct streaming mode that returns several
frames. One bench test settles it; implement Thor's form regardless.
- **Is THOR's preamble required?** Try one command cold and find out; it is a
two-minute test with the bench unit and it removes a ritual if unnecessary.
- **`Event` model fit** — Series IV carries fields Series III lacks (setup file
name, `LMic`/`SMic` channels). Extend `micromate/models.py`; do not fork the
shared `Event`.
- **Which `0x0C` fields to trust.** The peak float there runs 2–5% above
`max(T,V,L)` and is **not** the vector sum; its offset was inferred, not
established. The reference marks it do-not-rely-on — prefer decoded samples.
+699 -32
View File
@@ -150,12 +150,38 @@ Every frame in this session was produced by `build_bw_frame(sub, offset)` with
no Series IV changes, and the device accepted all of them:
```
[ACK 0x41] [STX 0x02] [10 10] [flags 00] [SUB] [00] [00] [offset] [params×10] [chk] [ETX 0x03]
[ACK 0x41] [STX 0x02] [10 10] [flags 00] [SUB] [00] [offset_hi] [offset_lo] [params×10] [chk] [ETX 0x03]
```
⚠ Only the doubled `BW_CMD` (`10 10`) form has been exercised. Whether other
literal `0x10` bytes inside params require stuffing is **untested** — none of
the probes sent carried one.
The *payload layout* is identical to Series III. The *stuffing* is not.
> #### ⚠ Correction, 2026-09-27 — `build_bw_frame()` is NOT sufficient
>
> This section used to say requests were Series III frames "unmodified", and
> the client spec accordingly planned to re-export
> `minimateplus.framing.build_bw_frame`. Measured against Thor's own frames,
> that builder reproduces **161 of 218** captured read frames. It escapes only
> `0x10`; a Micromate escapes four bytes (see *The escape set* below).
>
> The 57 it gets wrong are not obscure:
>
> | frame | why it breaks |
> |---|---|
> | **every `SUB 0x5A` download** | `offset = 0x0400` puts a literal `0x04` in `offset_hi`, which must go out as `10 04` |
> | `SUB 0x47` scheduler enable | `params[7] = 0x03` → `10 03` |
>
> An unescaped `0x03` or `0x04` *is* a frame terminator, so the unit sees a
> short frame and does not answer — indistinguishable from a dead unit, and
> event download would have hit it on the first request ever sent.
>
> `micromate/framing.py:build_request()` reproduces **218/218**. Pinned per
> frame in `tests/test_micromate_framing.py`.
✅ **Settled 2026-09-27: a `0x10` inside params needs no special handling.**
Previously flagged untested. Thor sends `SUB 0x5A` with
`params = 00 00 10 00 …` in five captured frames and the wire carries the
ordinary doubled `10 10`. There is no Series-III-style partial-stuffing
carve-out here — one rule covers the whole payload including the checksum.
### Responses — Series III *minus the DLE prefix*
@@ -181,18 +207,75 @@ mismatch.
[5+] data
```
### Checksum — the DLE-aware variant
### Checksum — plain SUM8 of the de-stuffed payload
```python
chk = sum(b for b in payload if b != 0x10) & 0xFF
chk = sum(payload) & 0xFF # payload already de-stuffed
```
Confirmed on every frame captured. The `POLL` probe response contains no
`0x10` and so cannot distinguish plain SUM8 from the DLE-aware form; the
`POLL` **data** response contains a `0x10` at payload offset 42, and only the
DLE-aware rule matches there. This is the same checksum Series III uses for
its `5A` bulk-stream and write frames — not the plain SUM8 of ordinary
Series III reads.
**251/251 responses and 251/251 requests**, across every capture in
`bridges/captures/9-24-26 - micromate2/`.
> #### ⚠ Correction, 2026-09-27 — "the DLE-aware variant"
>
> This section previously specified
> `chk = sum(b for b in payload if b != 0x10) & 0xFF`, and that is wrong **as
> paired with the uniform de-stuffing rule below.**
>
> The earlier claim was not a misreading; it was a correct rule attached to the
> wrong convention. The DLE-aware form belongs with *Series III* de-stuffing,
> which leaves an escaped byte in the payload as **two** bytes — there,
> skipping the `0x10` is the necessary correction. De-stuffing `10 XX → XX`
> already removes it, so excluding `0x10` as well **subtracts the correction
> twice**.
>
> Cost of the pairing, measured: it disagrees with the wire on **55 of 251**
> response frames — every frame whose payload holds a literal `0x10`. A clean
> example, from the `0x5A` chunk at offset `0x0070` of
> `raw_s3_…_Download_events_then_delete_1_event.bin`: the wire says `0xC1`,
> plain SUM8 says `0xC1`, the DLE-aware form says `0x91`.
>
> **Why nobody noticed:** `scratch/mm_frame_parse.py` accepts a frame matching
> *either* rule and labels which one hit. It reported those 55 frames as
> `SUM8` and never flagged one bad, so "zero bad checksums across 24, 38 and
> 40-frame sessions" was true and told us nothing about which rule was right.
> A tool that tries every candidate cannot falsify any of them — if it is going
> to stay permissive, it has to *report the split*, not just the pass.
>
> Pinned by `tests/test_micromate_framing.py`.
### The escape set — exactly four bytes
A Micromate escapes `0x02`, `0x03`, `0x04` and `0x10`, each prefixed with a
`DLE`, **and nothing else** — in both directions.
Established by re-stuffing every captured frame and comparing to the wire:
| candidate escape set | responses reproduced | requests reproduced |
|---|---|---|
| `{0x10}` — the Series III rule | 130/251 | 177/251 |
| `{0x10, 0x03}` | 135/251 | 184/251 |
| `{0x10, 0x02, 0x03}` | 178/251 | 192/251 |
| **`{0x10, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04}`** | **251/251** | **251/251** |
| `{0x10, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x41}` | 196/251 | — |
Corroborated independently by the byte that follows a wire `DLE`: across all
251 responses it is only ever `0x02` (933×), `0x03` (510×), `0x04` (655×) or
`0x10` (1179×). Nothing else ever appears there.
The last row matters because ACK looks like it ought to be escaped and is not —
a literal `0x41` in the data goes out bare.
**The checksum byte is escaped too.** Three captured responses have a checksum
of `0x02`/`0x03`/`0x04` and all three arrive as `10 XX` immediately before the
terminating `ETX`. No captured *request* happened to land on one, so Thor's
behaviour there is unobserved — but a device and its host share one framing
routine, and the alternative is a frame the far end truncates, so escape it.
This supersedes nothing: the de-stuffing rule `10 XX → XX` stays exactly as
documented. Knowing only four values are ever escaped is what makes that
uniform rule *exact* rather than merely convenient — and it is what an
**encoder** needs, which the write path will.
### The probe response carries the data length
@@ -573,8 +656,63 @@ Series III ignores a `5A` probe unless preceded by
answers a **bare `5A` request** with nothing before it. That whole ritual is
gone.
### ⚠ Correction, 2026-09-27 — THOR uses a 1024-byte chunk loop
The section below ("One request returns the entire event; there is no chunk
loop") describes **our own probes**, and it is not how THOR downloads an event.
Read from the wire, THOR's sequence per event is:
```
0x93 (arm) → 0x1E / 0x1F → key + size
0x0C → the 210-byte record
0x5A × n → n = ceil(size / 1024)
```
and the `0x5A` frames are a plain bounded chunk walk:
| | |
|---|---|
| chunk `i` offset | `min(1024, size − 1024·i)` — a **byte count** |
| chunk 0 params | `[key4][6 × 0x00]` — the key means "from the start" |
| chunk `i>0` params | `[00 00][uint16 BE of 1024·i][6 × 0x00]` |
| response data | exactly `offset + 11` bytes; the file bytes are `data[11:]` |
| response `page_key` | `offset // 256` — a page count, not an address |
**Verified on all six bench events**, sizes 4,076 → 13,424 bytes:
`sum(offsets) == size` **exactly** in every case, with the predicted chunk
count and predicted final offset. No `STRT` parsing, no `TERM` frame, no
over-read — that part of the original claim holds, and it is still far simpler
than the Series III walk.
```
key size(1E) chunks sum(offsets) last offset
055d4a81 4076 4 4076 0x03ec
055d4a82 11032 11 11032 0x0318
055d4a83 11502 12 11502 0x00ee
055d4a84 13424 14 13424 0x0070
055d4a85 8746 9 8746 0x022a
055d4a86 6092 6 6092 0x03cc
```
**These are probably two different modes, not a contradiction.** THOR's
`offset_hi` is the chunk length (`0x04`, `0x03`, `0x00` …). Our single-request
probes set `offset_hi = 0x10` — which in Series III is precisely the
bulk-stream marker `build_5a_frame()` writes raw. So `0x10XX` plausibly means
"stream until done" and returns **several** frames, which the parser of the day
concatenated into the 11,049 bytes recorded below. That reconciles both
observations, but it is a hypothesis: those 2026-09-23 captures never landed in
the repo, so it cannot be re-derived from bytes on disk.
**Implement THOR's chunked form.** It is verified byte-exact across six events
and five distinct sizes, and it is what the firmware runs every day. The
single-request form is worth one bench test as an optimisation — `offset_hi =
0x10` and count the frames — but not worth depending on first.
### The offset word is a LENGTH, not a position
⚠ Superseded as the implementation path by the correction above; the *reading*
of the field is right and is what makes THOR's chunk walk make sense.
This is the key divergence. Series III walks chunks by absolute flash
address, stepping `0x0200` per request. On the Micromate the offset word
requests *how much to send*:
@@ -591,10 +729,11 @@ offset_word = 0x1000 + 2 × pages pages = ceil(event_size / 512)
| `0x102C` | 22 | **11,033 — the whole event** |
`event_size` comes from the chain walk (the 4 bytes after the key in
`1E`/`1F`). **One request returns the entire event**; there is no chunk loop,
no `STRT` end-offset parsing, and no `TERM` frame. Over-requesting is safe —
`0x1030` (24 pages) returned exactly the same bytes as `0x102C`, so the device
caps at the real size.
`1E`/`1F`). **One request returns the entire event** ⚠ *— true of our
`offset_hi = 0x10` probes; see the 2026-09-27 correction above. THOR chunks* —
there is no `STRT` end-offset parsing and no `TERM` frame in either form.
Over-requesting is safe — `0x1030` (24 pages) returned exactly the same bytes
as `0x102C`, so the device caps at the real size.
Params are the Series III *probe* form: `[0x00][key4][6 × 0x00]`.
@@ -636,12 +775,231 @@ per-sample-exact applies.
### What a full read now looks like
```
0x93 → arm (THOR sends this before every 1E/1F)
1E → first key + size
0C(key) → project/client/operator, timestamp, peaks
5A(key, 0x1000+2×ceil(size/512)) → the whole .IDFW
1F → next key + size (until null sentinel)
5A × ceil(size/1024) → the .IDFW, 1024 bytes at a time
0x93 → 1F → next key + size (until null sentinel)
```
## ✅ Verified against real hardware, both transports (2026-09-29)
`micromate/{framing,protocol,client}.py` driven against **UM12947** by
`bridges/mm_client_check.py`, read-only, over both physical paths:
| | USB-B "PC" (CDC-ACM) | RX55 → TCP :9034 |
|---|---|---|
| identity, state, setups | identical | identical |
| bytes in / out | **11,580 / 761** | **11,580 / 761** |
| `list_setups()` (24 entries) | 0.46 s | **16.05 s** |
| 4,076 B download | 394 KiB/s | 1.6 KiB/s |
| transport reads | **83** | **36** |
**The wire bytes are identical on both paths** — same counts to the byte. The
protocol does not care which physical layer it runs over, which is what the
modem path needed to prove.
### ⚠ The modem needs FEWER reads, not more — the prediction was backwards
`mm_client_check.py` originally printed "a modem path should show MORE reads
for the same bytes". It shows **36 against USB's 83**. The modem *coalesces*:
it buffers for up to ~1 s and then forwards one large TCP segment, where
CDC-ACM delivers many small chunks as they arrive.
That is reassuring rather than alarming — the risk was a frame arriving split
across reads, and the modem splits **less** than USB does. The client reads to
frame completion rather than using `read_until_idle`'s idle-gap detection, and
handled both without a retry.
### 🔑 ~0.65 s per round trip over cellular, independent of payload
This is the number that matters for SFM's design.
```
list_setups() 24 commands 16.05 s ≈ 0.67 s each
get_state() 1 command 0.64 s
connect() 4 commands 2.53 s ≈ 0.63 s each
download 4 chunks 2.40 s ≈ 0.60 s each (1024 B per chunk)
```
The cost is per *command*, not per byte: a 1,024-byte chunk and a 16-byte
state read cost the same. **Over cellular, minimise round trips, not bytes.**
Concrete consequences:
- Enumerating setups costs **16 seconds** on a unit with 24 of them. Cache it;
do not refresh it on a timer.
- A 13 KB event is 14 chunks ≈ 8.4 s of latency against ~0.03 s of data. If
the single-request `offset_hi = 0x10` streaming mode is real (see
*`SUB 0x5A`*), it would cut a download to **one** round trip — that is worth
the two-minute bench test on its own.
- THOR's measured polling cost should be re-read in this light: its per-unit
status sweep is round trips, and round trips are what cellular charges for.
### End to end: downloaded events decode with the existing codec
All six bench events, assembled by `MicromateProtocol.read_event_file()` from
captured `0x5A` responses and fed to `micromate.idf_file.read_idf_file()`:
| key | size | type | decode |
|---|---|---|---|
| `055d4a81` | 4,076 | histogram | ✅ |
| `055d4a82` | 11,032 | waveform | ✅ 12,288 samples |
| `055d4a83` | 11,502 | waveform | ✅ 12,288 samples |
| `055d4a84` | 13,424 | waveform | ✅ 12,288 samples |
| `055d4a85` | 8,746 | waveform | ✅ 8,192 samples |
| `055d4a86` | 6,092 | histogram | ✅ |
**No new codec work is needed.** The bytes off the wire are the bytes
`thor-watcher` forwards today, so `/db/import/idf_file` ingests a directly
downloaded event unchanged.
### ✅ `11.0BD` confirmed on real hardware (2026-09-30)
UM20147 read over USB. **Every inference about the Thor firmware line held**,
and two of the three were covered only by *synthesised* test frames until now:
| inference | predicted | UM20147 reported |
|---|---|---|
| `flags = 0x03` identifies the line | `thor` | ✅ `thor` |
| `0x03` is ETX, so it arrives as `10 03` | destuffs before indexing | ✅ implied — the line could not be identified otherwise |
| model string is shorter | `MM/ISEE/S` | ✅ `MM/ISEE/S` |
| `0x1C` is 4 bytes longer, extras **trailing** | forward offsets survive | ✅ battery **3.55 V**, clock correct to the second |
That last row is the one that mattered. Series III's from-the-end offsets would
have produced **577.92 V** on this unit — a number so obviously wrong it is a
cheap self-check, which is why `mm_client_check.py` watches for it. Reading a
plausible 3.55 V and a correct clock confirms the four extra bytes really are
trailing.
Also read cleanly: serial `UM20147`, 5 setups (`factory.MMB` → `test2.mmb`),
active setup `test2.mmb`, 15,000,000 bytes total and free. 21 reads, 2,165 B in.
**One protocol stack drives the whole fleet regardless of firmware line** — the
headline finding of 2026-09-23 — is now demonstrated by a working client, not
just by matching response SUBs.
### ✅ A MONITORING unit answers reads normally (2026-09-30)
UM20147 was read while actively monitoring — `monitoring=True` on **both**
indicators (`0x49` content[0] and `0x1C` content[1], which agree) — and
answered POLL, serial, state, monitor status and a 5-entry setup walk with no
special handling.
**This confirms the `SESSION_RESET` finding with our own client.** Series III
*requires* a bare `41 03` before POLL or a monitoring unit will not answer over
TCP. That was previously inferred from its absence in THOR's captures; it is now
demonstrated directly, on the other firmware line, by a client that never sends
one.
Note THOR *refuses to send a setup* to a monitoring unit — that restriction is
about writes. Reads are unaffected.
Monitoring also moves two values, so neither is a stable thing to compare
against: battery drifted 3.55 → 3.50 V, and memory free dropped 15,000,000 →
14,848,448 (monitoring allocates as it runs).
### ⚠ Setup-name case is NOT consistent between `0x41` and `0x40`
Same unit, same session, same file:
```
0x41 active setup name -> test2.MMB
0x40 setup-list entry -> test2.mmb
```
An earlier run 45 minutes before reported `test2.mmb` from *both*, so the case
is not fixed per command either. What changed in between is that the unit
started monitoring — plausibly it rewrites the active-setup name in a canonical
form when loading a setup, but that is a guess from two samples.
**Practical consequence, which does not depend on the cause: compare setup file
names case-insensitively.** An exact-string test of "is the active setup one I
know about?" answers *no* on this unit. Worth fixing before it is a field bug —
Thor's own UI couples the scheduler to a setup name, so name matching is on the
path for anything that replaces it.
### ✅ Real BD bytes, and the exact numbers (2026-09-30)
Captured with `mm_client_check.py --capture` and read out with
`scratch/mm_frame_parse.py`: 11 frames each direction, 0 bad checksums. Both
BD-specific responses are now real fixtures in `tests/`, replacing synthesised
ones.
**`SUB 0x1C`, BD, 59 B data — the block the from-the-end offsets break on:**
```
content[ 1] 0x0e monitoring
content[ 2:6] 1e 09 07ea 30 Sep 2026
content[ 6] 0x60 = 96 ⚠ still unidentified (32/100/116 on CB)
content[ 7:10] 0e 00 31 14:00:49 ✓ matches the wall clock
content[34:36] 01 5e 3.50 V
content[36:40] 00 e4 e1 c0 15,000,000
content[40:44] 00 e2 91 c0 14,848,448
content[44:48] 0f a0 00 04 ⚠ the four extra bytes
```
`data[0] = 0x30` = 48 = 59 − 11, against CB's `0x2C` = 44. The low-byte length
rule and the +4 both hold.
⚠ **The extra four bytes are `0f a0 00 04`, not `0f a0 00 00`** as recorded
earlier. Only the first two look fixed. Nothing reads them, but do not treat
the last as padding.
**And the warning is now demonstrated on the unit it predicted:**
`data[-10:-8]` on this block is `e1 c0` → **577.92 V**. Exactly the figure in
the A/B section. Forward offsets give 3.50 V.
**`SUB 0x5B` POLL, BD:**
```
content[ 3] 0x56 ⚠ 0x50 on UM12947 — THIS BYTE VARIES BETWEEN UNITS
content[ 4] "Instantel\0"
content[26] "MM/ISEE/S\0" (CB: "MM/ISEE/S/IO\0", same offset)
```
⚠ **content[3] is not a constant.** It is printable on both units — `P` and `V`
— which is the second reason a printable-run scan is the wrong way to read this
block: it would return `PInstantel` on one unit and `VInstantel` on the other.
Read the vendor at the fixed offset content[4]; the model is at content[26] on
both lines, but anchor on `MM/` since only its tail varies.
### ✅ Download from a BD unit (2026-09-30)
UM20147, event `055d4a81`, 4,796 B, **type read as histogram from the `0x0C`
byte and decoded as `.IDFH` on the first try.** The chunk walk, the offset
arithmetic, the 11-byte chunk prefix and the record-type byte all hold on the
Thor firmware line unchanged.
The type byte is now **7 events across both firmware lines** — 4 waveform,
3 histogram — and has predicted correctly every time. Still not a large
sample, and the fallback stays.
### 🔑 EVENT KEYS COLLIDE ACROSS UNITS — dedup must be (serial, key)
UM20147's first event is `055d4a81`. So is UM12947's. **Different units,
different sizes (4,796 B vs 4,076 B), different contents, identical key.**
This confirms *keys are a sequential counter* (already recorded) and adds the
consequence: **the counter starts from the same value on every unit, so a key is
meaningless without its serial.**
⚠ **Anything that stores, deduplicates or addresses Series IV events must key on
`(serial, event_key)`.** A store keyed on the event key alone will silently
treat one unit's event as a duplicate of another's — and the failure is invisible,
because the second event is simply never ingested.
Series III has a related hazard the ACH server already handles: after an erase
its counter resets, so keys are reused *within* a unit, which is why
`ach_state.json` tracks `max_downloaded_key` per serial. Series IV inherits that
and adds cross-unit collision on top.
### Still not covered
- **A unit that is monitoring**, and a unit with a nearly-full event buffer.
- **The inbound call-home session** — still the one protocol unknown.
---
## Setups are FILES, not a config block
Series III has one compliance config you overwrite. Series IV keeps **named
@@ -1076,6 +1434,143 @@ the protocol's requirements*. Thor sends it before trivial reads too, so it may
be habit rather than handshake. Do not assume it is mandatory. Note `POLL` here carries `offset = 0x0030` (its data
length), not `0xFFFF` — `POLL` is the one read Thor still addresses by length.
> #### ⚠ Narrowed 2026-09-27 — there is no *universal* preamble
>
> Across all 8 captured sessions, the only invariant is that **the session opens
> with `POLL`**. What follows depends on the operation:
>
> | opening sequence | sessions | operation |
> |---|---|---|
> | `5b 15 49 5b …` | 3 | status refresh / monitoring / ACH change |
> | `5b 41 08 2e 1a da …` | 3 | setup push |
> | `5b 94 48 48 48 …` | 2 | scheduler read |
>
> So `POLL → SERIAL → 0x49 → POLL` is Thor's **connection check**, not a
> handshake the protocol demands — it appears where Thor wants to refresh what
> it displays. Treat `POLL` as the one thing to send first.
### 🔑 No `SESSION_RESET` — the Series III requirement does not carry over
Series III needs a bare `41 03` (ACK + ETX, no STX) to wake a unit that is
actively monitoring; without it the unit will not answer `POLL` over TCP, and
`protocol.startup()` sends it before and between the POLL frames.
**Thor never sends it to a Micromate.** Zero occurrences across all 8 sessions
— including `raw_bw_20260924_191214_turn_on_monitormode_…`, which exchanges 40
frames with a unit that *was* monitoring at the time.
### Measured offsets and response lengths (all read off Thor's frames)
`offset = 0xFFFF` for everything except two commands. Data lengths are from
UM12947 (`11.0CB`) and are **orientation, not assertions** — `0x1C` is 4 bytes
longer on the Thor line.
| SUB | rsp | offset | data | notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `0x5B` POLL | `0xA4` | **`0x0030`** | 59 | the one length-addressed read |
| `0x15` serial | `0xEA` | **`0x000A`** | 21 | |
| `0x49` state | `0xB6` | `0xFFFF` | 16 | |
| `0x1C` monitor status | `0xE3` | `0xFFFF` | 55 | +4 on `11.0BD` |
| `0x06` storage range | `0xF9` | `0xFFFF` | 47 | |
| `0x08` event index | `0xF7` | `0xFFFF` | 101 | contents unmapped |
| `0x2E` trigger config | `0xD1` | `0xFFFF` | 39 | |
| `0x1A` compliance | `0xE5` | `0xFFFF` | 2103 | one frame, not Series III's four |
| `0x2C` call-home | `0xD3` | `0xFFFF` | 137 | |
| `0x3F`/`0x40`/`0x41` setups | `0xC0`/`0xBF`/`0xBE` | `0xFFFF` | 266 | |
| `0x93` arm | `0x6C` | `0xFFFF` | 11 | ack only |
| `0x1E`/`0x1F` chain | `0xE1`/`0xE0` | `0xFFFF` | 19 | ⚠ **token `0xFE` at `params[7]`** |
| `0x0C` event record | `0xF3` | `0xFFFF` | 221 | full key at `params[4:8]` |
| `0x0A` monitor log | `0xF5` | `0xFFFF` | 297 | ⚠ a **walk** — see below |
| `0x5A` download | `0xA5` | computed | offset+11 | 1024-byte chunk loop |
An acknowledgement is an **11-byte data section**, and that doubles as the
end-of-list signal on the walks.
#### ⚠ `0x1E`/`0x1F` carry token `0xFE`
`params = 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fe 00 00` on all 7 captured chain reads — the
same `token_params(0xFE)` form Series III uses to arm its bulk stream. The
event-chain section above documents **all-zero params**; that was our own browse
probing, which also worked. Both evidently do, but Thor's form is the one with
mileage on it, and it is sent on browse and download alike.
#### 🔑 `SUB 0x0A` is the monitor-log walk, not a keyed read
The command table long described `0x0A` as a keyed "waveform header / partial
record" read, by analogy with Series III. What the bytes show is a **cursor
walk**: the *same request repeated*, the device advancing its own position.
```
0x93 → 1E → 0x0A ×8 (297 B each: "UM12947", "Histo…", "Ver…", " 0.49", " 28.4")
0x0A (11 B ack = end of list)
```
All nine frames carry identical params (`…00 00 4a 81 00 00`), so nothing in the
request selects the record. Terminate on a response of `ACK_DATA_LEN` (11).
⚠ The `4a 81` is the **low two bytes** of the event key then in play
(`055d4a81`). One key cannot distinguish "the key's low half" from "a cursor
handle that happened to equal it" — both produce those bytes. It does not
matter operationally, since the walk works with the params held constant.
This is a genuine structural divergence: Series III reaches the same data
through a record-type discriminator (`0x2C` partial vs `0x46` full) *on its
event walk*, so partial records and events share one chain. Here the monitor
log has its own cursor and the event chain never sees it.
#### 🔑 Every response has an 11-byte prefix — and its length byte lies
**Content starts at `data[11]`.** One rule, every command.
⚠ **`data[0]` is the content length `& 0xFF`, and there is no high byte
anywhere in the prefix.** `data[1]` is zero on every frame examined. So it
reads as a perfectly good length field for any response under 256 bytes — which
is most of them — and then:
| command | true content | `data[0]` says |
|---|---|---|
| `0x1A` compliance | 2,092 | **44** |
| `0x0A` monitor log | 286 | **30** |
| `0x5A` download chunk | 1,024 | **0** |
| `0x41` setup name | 255 | 255 ✓ (only just) |
182 of 251 captured responses agree with a naive uint16 LE read; the 69 that do
not are exactly the ones ≥ 256 bytes.
**This is the third time a length in this protocol has been read too narrow** —
after `payload[9]` vs `payload[8:10]` in the probe response, and after
`data[0]` here. The pattern is worth naming rather than fixing case by case:
*take the content as `data[11:]` and let the frame's own length bound it.*
Nothing needs the declared length; the frame already knows how long it is.
#### `SUB 0x5B` POLL content — where the strings actually sit
```
content[3] 0x50 ⚠ printable as "P", immediately before the vendor string
content[4] "Instantel\0"
content[17:26] binary — 06 00 c3 f0 4a 00 e4 19 4f 00 74 02
content[26] "MM/ISEE/S/IO\0" ← "MM/ISEE/S" on the Thor line
```
⚠ **Do not parse this by scanning for printable runs.** That `0x50` at
content[3] is printable, so a run scan returns `PInstantel`. Nothing
distinguishes a length or tag byte from text by inspection. Read the vendor
from the fixed offset and find the model by searching for `MM/` — structural
rather than positional, which is what survives the model string's
firmware-line difference.
#### `SUB 0x3F`/`0x40` setup walk — the terminator is an empty name
23 responses on the bench unit: 22 names, then a record whose name field is all
zeros. The empty name **is** the end of list — not an error, not a setup.
`factory.MMB` first, `TEST1.mmb` last.
#### `SUB 0x01` has no Thor frame behind it
Thor never reads device info in any captured session. `0xFFFF` for `0x01` comes
from our own 2026-09-23 probes — it answered correctly on both firmware lines,
but it is the only read in the table with no Thor precedent.
### `SUB 0x96` / `0x97` — start and stop monitoring ✅
Identical to Series III, including the acks:
@@ -1249,6 +1744,33 @@ length, and the timestamps are sequential across the recording session.
### Record type + filename: generate it, don't detect it
> #### 🔑 Update 2026-09-29 — there IS a type field, in the `0x0C` record
>
> **`0x0C` content[11]: `0x07` = waveform, `0x08` = histogram.**
>
> Found by diffing the six bench events' `0x0C` records against their known
> types: exactly one byte separates the two groups and is constant within each.
> It then predicted the right suffix for **6 of 6** on a blind re-run.
>
> ⚠ **Six events, split 4/2.** That is thin evidence for a byte that could be
> a counter, a channel count or a mode. Treat it as a strong candidate, not a
> settled field, and **keep a fallback**: `bridges/mm_client_check.py` tries the
> other suffix on failure and reports when the guess was wrong, which is how
> this would be caught rather than silently mis-filing an event.
>
> This does not overturn the section below — the *filename* still has to be
> generated, and the type still comes out of the protocol rather than the
> payload. It just means the type is available from a command we already send
> for every event, instead of needing to be carried out of the chain walk
> separately.
>
> ⚠ The claim below that the type comes from "`SUB 0x0A` length `0x1E` =
> histogram, `0x00` = waveform" **is not visible in the 2026-09-24 download
> capture**, where `0x0A` appears once as a standalone monitor-log walk after
> the last chain entry, not per event. Either it was observed in a session not
> in the repo, or the two are being conflated. The `0x0C` byte is reproducible
> from bytes on disk; prefer it.
`read_idf_file()` decides waveform vs histogram from the **filename suffix** —
and there is no filename when downloading over the wire.
@@ -1289,7 +1811,55 @@ given it, and `/db/import/idf_file` needs no change at all.
must carry it out of the chain walk. Losing it means losing the ability to
name the file correctly.
### ⚠ Unresolved: the `0x0C` peak float
### ✅ RESOLVED 2026-09-30: the `0x0C` float is the PER-SAMPLE peak vector sum
**`0x0C` content[`Tran` label − 12], float32 BE, = the peak vector sum computed
sample by sample.** Exact to 0.000% on all four bench waveforms, against a PVS
recomputed from the decoded samples:
| key | `0x0C` float | per-sample PVS | err | `sqrt(Σpeak²)` | `max(T,V,L)` |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `…82` | 1.37198 | 1.37198 | **+0.000%** | 1.41746 | 1.37063 |
| `…83` | 2.35414 | 2.35414 | **+0.000%** | 2.37824 | 2.22274 |
| `…84` | 3.51515 | 3.51515 | **−0.000%** | 3.78731 | 3.44194 |
| `…85` | 0.42267 | 0.42267 | **−0.000%** | 0.46678 | 0.41985 |
> #### ⚠ Retraction — why this looked unresolved
>
> The previous entry (below, kept) observed the float running 2–5% above
> `max(T,V,L)` and concluded it was **not** the peak vector sum, because
> "computed PVS runs *higher* than both".
>
> That computed PVS was `sqrt(T² + V² + L²)` **from the three reported channel
> peaks** — and that is an *upper bound* on the real thing, not the real thing.
> The channel maxima do not occur at the same instant, so combining them
> overstates the true peak. Every measurement in the old table is consistent
> with the correct answer: `max(T,V,L) ≤ stored ≤ sqrt(Σpeak²)`, in all five rows.
>
> A near-miss worth recording: on UM20147's event the stored float matched
> `sqrt(Σpeak²)` to **0.048%**, which briefly looked like proof it *was* that
> quantity. It is not — the peaks on that event simply happen to be nearly
> coincident in time. **One sample agreeing with a formula is not evidence when
> a second formula fits it equally well;** the six CB events separated them
> immediately (errors to −9.5%).
**The offset is now established, not inferred** — four independent confirmations
at 0.000%, plus a fifth on the other firmware line.
**Why this is worth having: it is a free self-check on the decoder.** The device
computed this number from the same samples we decode, independently of our
codec. If a decoded event's per-sample PVS does not match the stored float, the
decode is wrong. Given this codebase's history of *silent* channel truncation —
walker bugs that shorten a channel and raise nothing — a per-event invariant
that costs one float comparison is cheap insurance. Worth wiring into the
download path.
⚠ It remains true that `max(T,V,L)` and `sqrt(Σpeak²)` are **not**
interchangeable with it, so a consumer wanting the vector sum must use this
field or decode the samples — it cannot be reconstructed from the three
per-channel peaks.
#### Superseded: the original "unresolved" entry
The float32 extracted from `0x0C` runs 2–5% above `max(Tran, Vert, Long)` from
the decoded samples:
@@ -1302,15 +1872,38 @@ the decoded samples:
| `…84` | 3.5152 | 3.4419 |
| `…85` | 0.4227 | 0.4198 |
It is not peak vector sum either (computed PVS runs *higher* than both). The
~~It is not peak vector sum either (computed PVS runs *higher* than both). The
field may not be the peak at all — its offset was inferred from a byte marker,
not established. **Do not rely on it** until it is pinned properly.
not established. **Do not rely on it** until it is pinned properly.~~
Worth noting the histogram (`…81`) and the loudest waveform (`…84`) report
*identical* peaks to four decimals, in both measures. That is self-consistent:
the histogram's single 1-minute interval spans the whole thumping session, so
its maximum should equal the loudest event in it.
### `0x0C` field map, from UM20147 (11.0BD, 2026-09-30)
Real bytes, 221 B response → 210 B content declared at `data[0] = 0xd2`:
```
content[ 0] day 0x1e = 30
content[ 1] month 0x09
content[ 2:4] year BE 0x07ea = 2026
content[ 4] ⚠ 0xb3 = 179 — unidentified, same slot as 0x1C's content[6]
content[ 5:8] h:m:s 13:27:33
content[11] RECORD TYPE 0x08 histogram / 0x07 waveform
content[12] "Location\0" sensor-location label
content[34] "test2\0" the setup file name, without its extension
content[76] "UM20147\0" serial
content[86] float32 BE the per-sample PEAK VECTOR SUM (= Tran − 12)
content[98] "Tran\0\0" + float32 BE at +6
content[112] "Vert" … content[126] "Long" … content[140] "Mic" …
```
⚠ The setup name here is `test2` — no extension — where `0x41` reported
`test2.MMB` and `0x40` reported `test2.mmb` in the same session. Three commands,
three spellings of one file. See *Setup-name case*.
## Event download, per-event delete, and ACH config (2026-09-25)
Three captures with operator-supplied ground truth, including Thor screenshots of
@@ -2119,20 +2712,94 @@ FTDI is VID `0403`, Prolific is `067b`. Note also that counterfeit FTDI chips
are common in cheap cables — they carry FTDI's VID but may not behave like one,
and an embedded host with a single driver is far less forgiving than Linux.
### Does this explain the 2026-09-22 field outage?
### ✅ This accounts for the 2026-09-22 failure
⚠ **Not on the timeline as reported.** A Prolific cable does not fail
*gradually* — it never enumerates, so the modem port never works at all. The
unit was described as working at first and degrading.
An earlier draft of this section said the timeline did not fit, because the unit
was described as *working at first and then degrading* — which a Prolific cable
cannot do, since it never enumerates at all.
There is one story where it fits: if the initial success was over a **different
path** — the USB **PC** port, or a bench test before deployment — that would work
regardless of which serial cable was attached. The modem path would then have
been broken from the moment it was deployed, and "it worked and then stopped"
would be a recollection conflating two connection types days after the fact.
**The timeline was the thing that needed correcting, not the finding.** From the
operator, 2026-09-25:
Plausible, unverified, and recorded as such. Identifying that unit's cable would
settle it.
1. Initial setup — **one** modem, **one** cable. Worked: configs sent, status
read, no trouble.
2. Two Micromates then had to be deployed, so a **second cable** was fetched to
run both at once.
3. **Only one of the two ever worked.** The other would not talk over its modem
at any point.
4. That unit was never deployed — a **MiniMate Plus was put out in its place**,
and the Micromate came back to the bench.
5. The cable on that bench unit is a **Benfei (Prolific PL2303)**.
So nothing degraded. The "worked at first" was the original single-cable setup;
the failure began when the pair was split across two cables and one of them was
the wrong chipset. **One working and one not, set up side by side, is the
signature of a mixed cable supply** — not of a unit fault.
✅ **The cable travelled home with the unit** (confirmed 2026-09-25). So the
Benfei on the bench is physically the cable from the failed office setup — not a
substitute picked up later. There is no inference left in the chain:
| | |
|---|---|
| the cable from the failed unit | **is** a Benfei / Prolific PL2303 |
| the Micromate's USB host | has **no** Prolific driver, in either firmware line |
| a laptop on that same cable + modem | round-trips perfectly |
| the Micromate on it | never answered |
The FTDI cable arriving 2026-09-26 is now a confirmation rather than a test.
**Corollary worth knowing.** The standing workaround — *"just deploy a Series III
instead"* — works partly because a **MiniMate Plus has a DB-9 port directly on the
unit.** No USB-to-serial adapter anywhere in the path, so there is no chipset to
get wrong. That workaround has been quietly routing around this exact failure
mode.
### ✅ RESOLVED (2026-09-26) — and it took a cold boot as well as the cable
Swapping to a genuine FTDI cable (`lsusb`: `0403:6001`, FT232) **did not work on
its own.** A probe immediately after the swap returned the same *connected, no
reply*.
**A cold boot of the unit was also required.** Holding the power button for five
seconds — through the two-stage prompt that disconnects the internal battery —
and powering back up **with the cable already attached**, brought it straight up.
THOR at the office connected the moment it finished booting, and an independent
probe returned `UM12947, idle` over cellular.
⚠ **The USB host does not rescan on hot-swap.** The Micromate enumerates its
USB-A host port at boot; once it has failed to identify a device there it does
not appear to try again. Changing that cable is a power-cycle operation, and
anyone swapping one in the field who probes immediately will conclude the new
cable is faulty too.
So the full chain for a Micromate on a modem is:
1. an **FTDI** or CDC-ACM cable — a Prolific PL2303 gives the unit no serial port
2. a **cold boot** with that cable attached
### ✅ These modems bridge ONE session at a time — confirmed
Long suspected, never demonstrated. Demonstrated now, by accident:
| | probe result |
|---|---|
| THOR connected to the unit | `TCP connect ok` … **`NO REPLY`** |
| THOR disconnected, nothing else changed | `reply 68 B`, **`UM12947`**, idle |
The PAD **accepts** a second TCP connection and then does not forward it. It
does not refuse, and it does not close — it simply never bridges.
⚠ **This means "connected but no reply" has two causes that are indistinguishable
from the client side:** a genuinely broken serial path, and *somebody else
already has the unit*. `bridges/mm_probe.py` originally reported only the first,
which would send a diagnosis in exactly the wrong direction; its verdict now
names both and tells you to eliminate contention first.
**For SFM this is a design constraint, not a footnote.** Our receiver and THOR
cannot both hold a unit, and during any migration both will exist. "Another
client holds this unit" needs to be a distinct, visible state — not folded into
a failure, and certainly not into a green tick.
### How this was isolated — the method is reusable
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"""
client.py — high-level API for a live Micromate (Series IV).
Owns the transport, turns raw payloads into models. Read-only, like the layer
below it: nothing here writes, erases, or changes monitoring state.
with MicromateClient(TcpTransport("63.45.161.30", 9034)) as mm:
info = mm.connect()
print(info) # UM12947 MM/ISEE/S/IO blastware fw idle
print(mm.get_state()) # idle 2026-09-25 01:14:05 3.80 V memory 0.4% used
for name in mm.list_setups():
print(name)
The response layout, measured rather than assumed
-------------------------------------------------
**Every response carries an 11-byte prefix, and the content starts at
``data[11]``.** That one rule covers every command.
⚠ **``data[0]`` looks like the content length and is only its low byte.** A
2,092-byte setup block (`SUB 0x1A`) reports 44, and a 1,024-byte download chunk
reports 0. It happens to be right for every response shorter than 256 bytes,
which is most of them — so it reads as a working length field right up until it
silently loses 2,048 bytes. There is no high byte anywhere in the prefix; it is
``length & 0xFF`` and nothing more.
This is the same trap as ``MicromateFrame.probe_length``, in a different place,
and it is now the third time a length in this protocol has been read too narrow.
**Take the content as ``data[11:]`` and let the frame's own length bound it.**
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import datetime
import logging
from typing import Optional
from minimateplus.transport import BaseTransport
from .models import MicromateDeviceInfo, MicromateState
from .protocol import MicromateProtocol, ProtocolError
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# The content of every response begins here; the first 11 bytes are a prefix
# whose only decoded field is an unreliable low-byte length (see module docstring).
CONTENT = 11
# Field offsets, relative to the start of content. Sources are named because
# two of them disagree with docs/micromate_protocol_reference.md.
_STATE_FLAG = 0 # 0x49: 0x00 idle, 0x02 monitoring
_MS_FLAG = 1 # 0x1C: monitoring flag — test NON-ZERO
_MS_DAY, _MS_MONTH, _MS_YEAR = 2, 3, slice(4, 6)
_MS_UNKNOWN_6 = 6 # ⚠ NOT the hour — see read note below
_MS_HOUR, _MS_MIN, _MS_SEC = 7, 8, 9
_MS_BATTERY = slice(34, 36) # uint16 BE, volts × 100
_MS_MEM_TOTAL = slice(36, 40) # uint32 BE
_MS_MEM_FREE = slice(40, 44) # uint32 BE
# A setup-list walk that does not terminate is a bug, not a big fleet. The
# bench unit holds 22 setups; this is a generous ceiling, not a limit.
_MAX_SETUPS = 512
def _content(data: bytes) -> bytes:
"""Strip the 11-byte response prefix."""
return data[CONTENT:] if len(data) > CONTENT else b""
def _cstring(buf: bytes, offset: int = 0) -> str:
"""A null-terminated ASCII run, stripped."""
return buf[offset:].split(b"\x00")[0].decode("ascii", "replace").strip()
class MicromateClient:
"""High-level read-only client for one Micromate.
Owns the transport, unlike ``MicromateProtocol``, which borrows it.
"""
def __init__(
self,
transport: BaseTransport,
recv_timeout: float = 10.0,
strict_checksums: bool = True,
) -> None:
self._transport = transport
self._proto = MicromateProtocol(
transport, recv_timeout=recv_timeout, strict_checksums=strict_checksums
)
self._firmware_line: Optional[str] = None
# ── Lifecycle ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def open(self) -> None:
self._transport.connect()
def close(self) -> None:
self._transport.disconnect()
def is_open(self) -> bool:
return self._transport.is_connected()
def __enter__(self) -> "MicromateClient":
self.open()
return self
def __exit__(self, *_) -> None:
self.close()
@property
def protocol(self) -> MicromateProtocol:
"""The wire layer, for anything this class does not wrap yet."""
return self._proto
# ── Identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def connect(self, *, with_active_setup: bool = True) -> MicromateDeviceInfo:
"""`POLL → SERIAL → state`, plus the active setup name.
⚠ **This is deliberately not Thor's full preamble.** Thor sends
`POLL → SERIAL → 0x49 → POLL` and the client spec said to copy it
verbatim on the grounds that it is known-good. Measuring all 8 captured
sessions showed the only invariant is that a session **opens with
POLL** — the four-command form appears in 3 of 8 and is Thor's
*connection check*, run where it wants to refresh what it displays. The
trailing POLL is a repeat of the first.
So this sends the three reads that actually gather something. Dropping
the fourth is a judgement call on measured evidence, not a proof that
nothing depends on it; if a unit ever refuses the next command after a
cold connect, put it back and say so in the protocol reference.
`SUB 0x01` (device info) is **not** read. Thor never reads it in any
captured session, its field layout is unmapped beyond eight `1.0f`
floats, and `firmware_line` — the one thing we would want from it — comes
free from the flags byte of any response.
"""
poll = self._proto.poll()
self._firmware_line = poll.firmware_line
manufacturer, model = self._parse_poll(poll.data)
serial = _cstring(_content(self._proto.read_serial()))
monitoring = self._parse_state(self._proto.read_state())
info = MicromateDeviceInfo(
serial=serial,
manufacturer=manufacturer,
model=model,
firmware_line=poll.firmware_line,
monitoring=monitoring,
)
if with_active_setup:
try:
info.active_setup = self.get_active_setup()
except ProtocolError as e:
# Not worth failing a connect over: a unit with no setup loaded
# is a real state, and the caller can still read everything else.
log.warning("active setup unreadable: %s", e)
log.info("connected: %s", info)
return info
@staticmethod
def _parse_poll(data: bytes) -> tuple[Optional[str], Optional[str]]:
"""Manufacturer and model out of the POLL block.
`Instantel` sits at content[4] and the model at content[26], with 13
binary bytes between them.
⚠ A generic "find the printable runs" scan does **not** work here, which
cost a test failure before it cost anything worse. content[3] is `0x50`
— printable as `P` — sitting immediately before `Instantel`, so a run
scan returns `PInstantel`. Nothing distinguishes a length or tag byte
from text by inspection.
So: the manufacturer comes from a fixed offset, and the model is found by
searching for `MM/`. That anchor is structural rather than positional,
which matters because the model string **differs by firmware line** —
`MM/ISEE/S/IO` on the Blastware build, `MM/ISEE/S` on the Thor build —
and only its tail changes.
"""
c = _content(data)
manufacturer = _cstring(c, 4) or None
idx = c.find(b"MM/")
model = _cstring(c, idx) if idx >= 0 else None
return manufacturer, model
@staticmethod
def _parse_state(data: bytes) -> Optional[bool]:
"""`SUB 0x49` content[0]: 0x00 idle, 0x02 monitoring.
⚠ Tested for non-zero, never against `0x02`. The sibling flag in
`SUB 0x1C` has read both `0x0E` and `0x0C` while monitoring, so this
family of flags is not a stable enum.
"""
c = _content(data)
return bool(c[_STATE_FLAG]) if c else None
# ── State ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def get_state(self) -> MicromateState:
"""`SUB 0x1C` — monitoring, device clock, battery, memory.
⚠ Every offset here is **forward from the start of content**, never
backward from the end. Series III reads battery and memory from the end
of this block, and this block is **4 bytes longer on the Thor firmware
line** — applying from-the-end offsets to a `11.0BD` unit yields a
battery voltage of 577.92 V. The four extra bytes are trailing, so
from-the-start offsets hold for both lines.
✅ **Confirmed on `11.0BD` 2026-09-30.** UM20147 read back 3.55 V and
a clock correct to the second over USB, so the from-the-start offsets do
survive the four extra trailing bytes. Had they not, the battery would
have read 577.92 V — which is what makes this cheap to check.
"""
data = self._proto.read_monitor_status()
c = _content(data)
if len(c) < 44:
raise ProtocolError(
f"monitor status content is {len(c)} B, need at least 44"
)
battery = int.from_bytes(c[_MS_BATTERY], "big") / 100.0
return MicromateState(
monitoring=bool(c[_MS_FLAG]),
device_time=self._parse_clock(c),
battery_volts=battery,
memory_total_bytes=int.from_bytes(c[_MS_MEM_TOTAL], "big"),
memory_free_bytes=int.from_bytes(c[_MS_MEM_FREE], "big"),
raw=data,
)
@staticmethod
def _parse_clock(c: bytes) -> Optional[datetime.datetime]:
"""The unit's own clock, in its own local time.
⚠ **content[6] is not part of the time.** The layout is day, month,
year, *one unidentified byte*, then h/m/s — so the hour is at content[7].
The protocol reference's `SUB 0x1C` section has this right and names
`data[17]` as unidentified; its one-line summary in the divergences list
("day/month/year/h/m/s at `data[13:21]`") reads as six contiguous fields
and is the version worth not trusting.
Re-measured here across three captures: content[6] read 32, 100 and 116,
none a valid hour, while content[7:10] gave 19:12:25, 19:13:34 and
01:14:05 against capture filenames stamped 19:12:14, 19:12:14 and
01:14:03 — each seconds to a minute after its session opened, which is
what a device clock should do.
content[6] is undecoded and deliberately not exposed.
"""
try:
return datetime.datetime(
year=int.from_bytes(c[_MS_YEAR], "big"),
month=c[_MS_MONTH],
day=c[_MS_DAY],
hour=c[_MS_HOUR],
minute=c[_MS_MIN],
second=c[_MS_SEC],
)
except ValueError as e:
# A unit with a dead clock battery reports an impossible date. That
# is information, not a reason to fail the whole state read.
log.warning("device clock unreadable (%s): %s", e, c[2:10].hex(" "))
return None
# ── Setups ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def get_active_setup(self) -> str:
"""`SUB 0x41` — the loaded `.MMB` file name, e.g. `TEST1.mmb`."""
return _cstring(_content(self._proto.read_active_setup_name()))
def list_setups(self) -> list[str]:
"""`0x3F` then `0x40`… — every setup file stored on the unit.
A cursor walk: the device holds the position, so the same `0x40` request
returns the next name. **An empty name terminates the list** — it is
not an error and not a real setup.
Measured on the bench unit: 23 responses, 22 names then the empty one,
`factory.MMB` first through `TEST1.mmb` last.
"""
names: list[str] = []
raw = self._proto.read_first_setup()
for _ in range(_MAX_SETUPS):
name = _cstring(_content(raw))
if not name:
return names
names.append(name)
raw = self._proto.read_next_setup()
raise ProtocolError(
f"setup list did not terminate after {_MAX_SETUPS} entries — the "
f"device cursor is not advancing"
)
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"""
framing.py — frame codec for the Instantel Micromate (Series IV) wire protocol.
A Micromate answers Series III *command* frames, so the request side looks
familiar. The framing underneath is not the same, and the differences are all
of the kind that produce a silently-ignored frame rather than an error:
Series III response: [DLE 0x10] [STX 0x02] … [chk] [ETX 0x03]
Micromate response: [STX 0x02] … [chk] [ETX 0x03]
^ no leading DLE
That missing byte is why `minimateplus.framing.S3FrameParser` returns *nothing*
on Micromate traffic — it locates frames by scanning for `DLE STX`, which never
occurs. A capture holding 12 acknowledged writes reads as 12 unanswered
requests.
De-stuffed payload layout (both directions):
request response
[0] CMD 0x10 [0] CMD 0x00
[1] flags 0x00 [1] flags 0xC5 / 0x03 ← firmware line
[2] SUB [2] SUB 0xFF − request_SUB
[3] 0x00 [3] PAGE_HI
[4] offset_hi [4] PAGE_LO
[5] offset_lo [5+] data
[6:16] params (10 bytes)
Everything below was established against the 251 request and 251 response
frames in `bridges/captures/9-24-26 - micromate2/` (UM12947, firmware 11.0CB).
Where a rule is asserted, the number of frames it was checked on is given — the
two rules that look like small details cost 26% and 22% of frames respectively
when guessed wrong, so the counts are the point.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Optional
# ── Protocol byte constants ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
DLE = 0x10 # Data Link Escape
STX = 0x02 # Start of text — begins a frame
ETX = 0x03 # End of text — ends a frame
ACK = 0x41 # Frame-start marker on the request side
MM_CMD = 0x10 # payload[0] in a request
MM_RSP_CMD = 0x00 # payload[0] in a response
# payload[1] of a response identifies the firmware line it came from.
# ⚠ Two units, one of each — a strong hypothesis, not a proven encoding.
FLAGS_BLASTWARE = 0xC5 # the 11.0CB line (UM12947)
FLAGS_THOR = 0x03 # the 11.0BD line (UM20147)
# ⚠ THE ESCAPE SET. A Micromate escapes exactly these four byte values,
# prefixing each with a DLE — and nothing else. Established by re-stuffing
# every captured frame and comparing to the wire: 251/251 responses and 251/251
# requests reproduce byte-for-byte with this set, and no other candidate set
# reproduces even 200 of either.
#
# The two near-misses are worth naming, because both look plausible:
# * `{0x10}` alone — the Series III rule — reproduces 130/251 responses and
# 177/251 requests.
# * adding ACK (0x41) reproduces only 196/251 responses: a literal 0x41 in
# the data is NOT escaped.
_ESCAPED = frozenset({STX, ETX, 0x04, DLE})
# A response header is 5 bytes; a frame must also carry its checksum.
_MIN_PAYLOAD = 5
_REQUEST_PAYLOAD_SIZE = 16
# ── Stuffing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def stuff(data: bytes) -> bytes:
"""Escape every byte the Micromate escapes: `XX` → `10 XX` for the four."""
out = bytearray()
for b in data:
if b in _ESCAPED:
out.append(DLE)
out.append(b)
return bytes(out)
def unstuff(data: bytes) -> bytes:
"""Reverse `stuff()`: `10 XX` → `XX`, for any XX.
Uniform, with no inner-frame carve-out — which is a real simplification
over Series III, where `DLE+ETX` inside a frame is literal data that must
survive de-stuffing. Since only four byte values are ever escaped, taking
*any* `10 XX` as `XX` is exact rather than merely convenient.
"""
out = bytearray()
i = 0
while i < len(data):
if data[i] == DLE and i + 1 < len(data):
out.append(data[i + 1])
i += 2
else:
out.append(data[i])
i += 1
return bytes(out)
# ── Checksum ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def checksum(payload: bytes) -> int:
"""SUM8 of the **de-stuffed** payload, mod 256. 251/251 both directions.
⚠ Do NOT exclude `0x10` bytes from this sum. The DLE-aware checksum that
Series III uses for its `5A` and write frames is the right answer to a
*different* question: it pairs with Series III de-stuffing, which leaves
escaped bytes in the payload as two bytes. De-stuffing uniformly already
removes the DLE, so excluding `0x10` as well subtracts the correction
twice.
That combination — uniform de-stuffing *and* an exclusive sum — is what
`scratch/mm_frame_parse.py` shipped with. It disagrees with the wire on
**55 of 251** captured response frames, all of them frames whose payload
holds a literal `0x10`. The script only ever looked correct because it
accepts a frame that matches *either* rule, so it reported those 55 as
plain SUM8 and never flagged one bad.
"""
return sum(payload) & 0xFF
# ── Request builder ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def build_request(sub: int, offset: int = 0, params: bytes = bytes(10)) -> bytes:
"""Build a host→unit command frame.
⚠ Do **not** substitute `minimateplus.framing.build_bw_frame()` here, even
though the payload layout is identical. That builder escapes only `0x10`,
so it reproduces just **161 of Thor's 218** captured read frames. The 57 it
gets wrong are not edge cases:
* every `SUB 0x5A` bulk download — `offset = 0x0400` puts a literal
`0x04` in `offset_hi`, which must go out as `10 04`
* `SUB 0x47` (scheduler enable), whose params carry a `0x03`
An unescaped `0x03` or `0x04` reads as a frame terminator, so the unit sees
a truncated frame and simply does not answer. That is indistinguishable
from a dead unit, and event download would have hit it on the first try.
With the correct escape set this builder reproduces **218/218**.
Args:
sub: command SUB byte.
offset: uint16 at payload[4:5]. Micromate reads are single-step —
Thor asks for `0xFFFF` and gets the whole block — so this is
usually `0xFFFF`, not Series III's probe-then-data pair.
params: exactly 10 bytes at payload[6:16].
A `0x10` inside `params` is fine and needs no special handling: Thor sends
`SUB 0x5A` with `params = 00 00 10 00 …` and the wire carries `10 10`.
(This was the spec's one open question; five captured frames settle it.)
"""
if len(params) != 10:
raise ValueError(f"params must be exactly 10 bytes, got {len(params)}")
if not 0 <= offset <= 0xFFFF:
raise ValueError(f"offset must fit in uint16, got {offset:#x}")
if not 0 <= sub <= 0xFF:
raise ValueError(f"sub must be a single byte, got {sub:#x}")
payload = bytes([MM_CMD, 0x00, sub, 0x00, (offset >> 8) & 0xFF, offset & 0xFF]) + params
body = payload + bytes([checksum(payload)])
return bytes([ACK, STX]) + stuff(body) + bytes([ETX])
# ── Response frame ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@dataclass
class MicromateFrame:
"""A parsed, de-stuffed unit→host response frame."""
sub: int # response SUB; the request was 0xFF − this
flags: int # payload[1] — 0xC5 Blastware line, 0x03 Thor line
page_hi: int
page_lo: int
data: bytes # payload[5:], checksum stripped
checksum_valid: bool
chk_byte: int = 0 # the checksum byte as received
@property
def request_sub(self) -> int:
"""The SUB this is answering. No known exception to `0xFF − SUB`."""
return 0xFF - self.sub
@property
def page_key(self) -> int:
"""payload[3:5] as a uint16 BE — a page/address on `0x5A` responses."""
return (self.page_hi << 8) | self.page_lo
@property
def firmware_line(self) -> str:
return {FLAGS_BLASTWARE: "blastware", FLAGS_THOR: "thor"}.get(self.flags, "unknown")
@property
def probe_length(self) -> Optional[int]:
"""Data length declared by a **probe** response: uint16 BE at data[3:5].
⚠ Only meaningful in the reply to an `offset = 0` probe. Series III
hardcodes a `DATA_LENGTHS` table; a Micromate will tell you instead,
which already caught one divergence (call-home config is `0x7E`, where
Series III has `0x7C`).
⚠ It is a **uint16 BE**, not a byte. Read as `data[3]` alone it is
right only while the high byte is zero, and wrong by 47x for
`SUB 0x1A`: a true `0x082C` (2092) reads as 44.
Returns None on a frame too short to hold the field. Note this reads
as 0 on the single-step reads Thor actually uses — those are not probes,
and `page_key` is the meaningful field there.
"""
if len(self.data) < 5:
return None
return (self.data[3] << 8) | self.data[4]
# ── Streaming parser ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class MicromateFrameParser:
"""Incremental parser for unit→host frames. Mirrors `S3FrameParser`.
Feed bytes with `feed()`; completed frames are returned and also collected
in `.frames`.
IDLE — scanning for a bare STX
IN_FRAME — collecting; bare ETX terminates
AFTER_DLE — the next byte is literal, whatever it is
Request frames are rejected rather than parsed: a frame whose `payload[0]`
is not `0x00` is dropped, so feeding a bidirectional capture yields only
the responses.
"""
_IDLE, _IN_FRAME, _AFTER_DLE = 0, 1, 2
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._state = self._IDLE
self._body = bytearray()
self.frames: list[MicromateFrame] = []
# Distinguishes "no bytes at all" from "bytes but no complete frame" on
# a timeout. That distinction earned its keep during the Series III
# work and costs one integer here.
self.bytes_fed: int = 0
def reset(self) -> None:
self._state = self._IDLE
self._body.clear()
self.bytes_fed = 0
def feed(self, data: bytes) -> list[MicromateFrame]:
self.bytes_fed += len(data)
completed: list[MicromateFrame] = []
for b in data:
frame = self._step(b)
if frame is not None:
completed.append(frame)
self.frames.append(frame)
return completed
def _step(self, b: int) -> Optional[MicromateFrame]:
if self._state == self._IDLE:
if b == STX:
self._body.clear()
self._state = self._IN_FRAME
# Boot strings, modem RING/CONNECT chatter and stray ACKs land here
# and are discarded.
elif self._state == self._IN_FRAME:
if b == DLE:
self._state = self._AFTER_DLE
elif b == ETX:
self._state = self._IDLE
return self._finalise()
else:
self._body.append(b)
elif self._state == self._AFTER_DLE:
# Uniform rule: the escaped byte is itself, including 0x03.
self._body.append(b)
self._state = self._IN_FRAME
return None
def _finalise(self) -> Optional[MicromateFrame]:
body = bytes(self._body)
if len(body) < _MIN_PAYLOAD + 1:
return None
payload, chk_received = body[:-1], body[-1]
if payload[0] != MM_RSP_CMD:
return None # a request frame, or garbage that framed by accident
return MicromateFrame(
sub = payload[2],
flags = payload[1],
page_hi = payload[3],
page_lo = payload[4],
data = payload[5:],
checksum_valid = (chk_received == checksum(payload)),
chk_byte = chk_received,
)
+82
View File
@@ -396,3 +396,85 @@ class IdfEvent:
)
ev._waveform_key = waveform_key
return ev
# ── Live-device models (2026-09-27) ───────────────────────────────────────────
#
# These describe what a unit reports over the wire, not what Thor wrote to a
# file. Everything above this line came out of Thor's exports; everything below
# came out of Thor's *traffic*. Field offsets are recorded in
# ``micromate/client.py`` next to the code that reads them.
@dataclass
class MicromateDeviceInfo:
"""Identity gathered by ``MicromateClient.connect()``.
Sourced from three reads:
``0x5B`` POLL → manufacturer, model
``0x15`` SERIAL → serial
``0x49`` STATE → monitoring
plus ``firmware_line``, which comes free from the flags byte of any
response and needs no read of its own.
"""
serial: str
manufacturer: Optional[str] = None # "Instantel"
model: Optional[str] = None # "MM/ISEE/S/IO" (CB) / "MM/ISEE/S" (BD)
firmware_line: Optional[str] = None # "blastware" | "thor" | "unknown"
monitoring: Optional[bool] = None
active_setup: Optional[str] = None # e.g. "TEST1.mmb"
def __str__(self) -> str:
bits = [self.serial]
if self.model:
bits.append(self.model)
if self.firmware_line:
bits.append(f"{self.firmware_line} fw")
if self.monitoring is not None:
bits.append("MONITORING" if self.monitoring else "idle")
if self.active_setup:
bits.append(f"setup={self.active_setup}")
return " ".join(bits)
@dataclass
class MicromateState:
"""A unit's live state, from ``SUB 0x1C``.
``device_time`` is the unit's own clock, in its own local timezone — it is
NOT converted. Nothing else this protocol exposes reports the unit's time,
which makes it the only way to detect a drifted clock before it lands in
event timestamps.
"""
monitoring: bool
device_time: Optional[datetime.datetime] = None
battery_volts: Optional[float] = None
memory_total_bytes: Optional[int] = None
memory_free_bytes: Optional[int] = None
raw: Optional[bytes] = field(default=None, repr=False)
@property
def memory_used_bytes(self) -> Optional[int]:
if self.memory_total_bytes is None or self.memory_free_bytes is None:
return None
return self.memory_total_bytes - self.memory_free_bytes
@property
def memory_used_fraction(self) -> Optional[float]:
used = self.memory_used_bytes
if used is None or not self.memory_total_bytes:
return None
return used / self.memory_total_bytes
def __str__(self) -> str:
bits = ["MONITORING" if self.monitoring else "idle"]
if self.device_time:
bits.append(self.device_time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"))
if self.battery_volts is not None:
bits.append(f"{self.battery_volts:.2f} V")
frac = self.memory_used_fraction
if frac is not None:
bits.append(f"memory {frac * 100:.1f}% used")
return " ".join(bits)
+501
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,501 @@
"""
protocol.py — one method per Micromate (Series IV) wire command.
Returns raw payload bytes. Interpretation belongs in ``client.py``; this layer
knows frames, offsets and sequencing, and nothing about what a field means.
Scope: **reads only.** Nothing here writes, erases, or changes monitoring
state. That is deliberate and worth keeping — no command has ever been
originated against a unit by this project; every write in
``docs/micromate_protocol_reference.md`` was performed by THOR while we
recorded. The first thing this codebase ever sends to a customer's instrument
should be a decision someone made on purpose, not a side effect of a client
that grew a method.
Every offset and params layout below was read off THOR's own frames in
``bridges/captures/9-24-26 - micromate2/`` rather than taken from the spec
table, because the same exercise during the framing work found three of that
table's rules wrong. It found three more here:
* ``0x0A`` is the **monitor-log walk** — the same request repeated, the
device advancing its own cursor, terminated by a short response — not the
keyed "event header, 30 B list record" the spec describes.
* ``0x1E``/``0x1F`` carry **token 0xFE** at ``params[7]``. The protocol
reference documents all-zero params for the browse walk; that was our own
probing, and THOR does not do it that way.
* There is **no fixed preamble**. Sessions open with ``POLL`` and go
straight to the operation. ``POLL → SERIAL → 0x49 → POLL`` appears in 3 of
8 captured sessions and is THOR's *connection check*, not a handshake.
And one useful negative: **no ``SESSION_RESET`` (``41 03``).** Series III
needs that 2-byte signal to wake a monitoring unit or it will not answer POLL
over TCP. THOR never sends it — 0 occurrences across all 8 sessions, including
40 frames exchanged with a unit that *was* monitoring.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import math
import struct
import time
from typing import Optional
from minimateplus.transport import BaseTransport
from .framing import MicromateFrame, MicromateFrameParser, build_request
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
DEFAULT_RECV_TIMEOUT = 10.0
# An acknowledgement carries an 11-byte data section and nothing else. It is
# also how the monitor-log walk says "no more records".
ACK_DATA_LEN = 11
# ── Command SUBs ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
SUB_DEVICE_INFO = 0x01
SUB_STORAGE_RANGE = 0x06
SUB_EVENT_INDEX = 0x08
SUB_MONITOR_LOG = 0x0A
SUB_EVENT_RECORD = 0x0C
SUB_SERIAL = 0x15
SUB_COMPLIANCE_CONFIG = 0x1A
SUB_MONITOR_STATUS = 0x1C
SUB_EVENT_FIRST = 0x1E
SUB_EVENT_NEXT = 0x1F
SUB_CALL_HOME_CONFIG = 0x2C
SUB_TRIGGER_CONFIG = 0x2E
SUB_SETUP_FIRST = 0x3F
SUB_SETUP_NEXT = 0x40
SUB_SETUP_ACTIVE = 0x41
SUB_STATE = 0x49
SUB_BULK_DOWNLOAD = 0x5A
SUB_POLL = 0x5B
SUB_ARM_EVENT = 0x93
# ⚠ Reads are SINGLE-STEP. Series III probes at offset 0 to learn the length,
# then reads again at that length; a Micromate returns the whole block when
# asked for 0xFFFF. THOR never probes, which is why `MicromateFrame.probe_length`
# reads 0 on live traffic.
READ_ALL = 0xFFFF
# The two commands that do NOT use READ_ALL, and the data length each returned
# on UM12947 (firmware 11.0CB).
_OFFSETS = {
SUB_POLL: 0x0030, # 59 B — the one offset THOR treats as a constant
SUB_SERIAL: 0x000A, # 21 B
}
# Data-section lengths observed, for orientation only — deliberately NOT
# asserted. `SUB 0x1C` is 4 bytes longer on the Thor firmware line (0x30 vs
# 0x2C declared), so a length check here would fire spuriously on half the
# fleet. See the protocol reference, "A/B: Blastware build vs Thor build".
OBSERVED_DATA_LEN = {
SUB_STORAGE_RANGE: 47, SUB_EVENT_INDEX: 101, SUB_MONITOR_LOG: 297,
SUB_EVENT_RECORD: 221, SUB_SERIAL: 21, SUB_COMPLIANCE_CONFIG: 2103,
SUB_MONITOR_STATUS: 55, SUB_EVENT_FIRST: 19, SUB_EVENT_NEXT: 19,
SUB_CALL_HOME_CONFIG: 137, SUB_TRIGGER_CONFIG: 39,
SUB_SETUP_FIRST: 266, SUB_SETUP_NEXT: 266, SUB_SETUP_ACTIVE: 266,
SUB_STATE: 16, SUB_POLL: 59, SUB_ARM_EVENT: ACK_DATA_LEN,
}
# `1E`/`1F` carry this at params[7]. Series III uses the same value to arm its
# bulk stream; here THOR sends it on every chain read, browse or download.
EVENT_TOKEN = 0xFE
# `SUB 0x5A` chunk size, in bytes of file payload per response.
CHUNK_SIZE = 1024
# Every `0x5A` response prefixes the file bytes with 11 bytes of header.
_CHUNK_PREFIX = 11
# ── Exceptions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class ProtocolError(Exception):
"""The device violated the expected protocol."""
class TimeoutError(ProtocolError):
"""No response arrived within the allowed time."""
class ChecksumError(ProtocolError):
"""A received frame failed its checksum."""
class UnexpectedResponse(ProtocolError):
"""The response SUB did not match the request."""
class ShortRead(ProtocolError):
"""A bulk download returned fewer bytes than the device promised."""
# ── Params builders ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def token_params(token: int = EVENT_TOKEN) -> bytes:
"""`1E`/`1F`: the token sits at params[7]."""
return bytes(7) + bytes([token]) + bytes(2)
def key_params(key4: bytes) -> bytes:
"""`0x0C`: the full 4-byte event key at params[4:8]."""
if len(key4) != 4:
raise ValueError(f"key4 must be 4 bytes, got {len(key4)}")
return bytes(4) + key4 + bytes(2)
def key_lo_params(key4: bytes) -> bytes:
"""`0x0A`: only the key's **low two bytes**, at params[6:8].
⚠ Inferred from a single key value. All nine captured `0x0A` frames carry
`4a 81`, and the event key in play was `055d4a81` — so this is consistent
with "the low half of the current key" and equally consistent with "a
cursor handle that happened to equal it". Both readings produce the same
bytes for that key, so one event cannot separate them.
It does not matter much in practice: the walk works with the same params
repeated, so whichever it is, passing the current key is right.
"""
if len(key4) != 4:
raise ValueError(f"key4 must be 4 bytes, got {len(key4)}")
return bytes(6) + key4[2:4] + bytes(2)
def chunk_params(key4: bytes, byte_offset: int) -> bytes:
"""`0x5A`: the key opens the file, then a byte offset walks it.
Chunk 0 carries the event key at params[0:4] — that is what says "from the
beginning". Later chunks carry a uint16 BE byte offset at params[2:4].
"""
if byte_offset == 0:
if len(key4) != 4:
raise ValueError(f"key4 must be 4 bytes, got {len(key4)}")
return key4 + bytes(6)
if not 0 <= byte_offset <= 0xFFFF:
raise ValueError(f"byte_offset must fit in uint16, got {byte_offset}")
return bytes(2) + struct.pack(">H", byte_offset) + bytes(6)
# ── Protocol ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class MicromateProtocol:
"""Wire-level command set for one open connection to a Micromate.
Does not own the transport; lifetime belongs to the client.
proto = MicromateProtocol(transport)
proto.poll()
serial = proto.read_serial()
"""
def __init__(
self,
transport: BaseTransport,
recv_timeout: float = DEFAULT_RECV_TIMEOUT,
strict_checksums: bool = True,
) -> None:
"""
Args:
strict_checksums: raise on a bad checksum. **Defaults to True,
unlike the Series III sibling**, which logs and continues
because its parser cannot reliably tell an inner-frame
delimiter from a checksum byte. That excuse does not apply
here: the Micromate rule is plain SUM8 over the de-stuffed
payload and it holds on 251 of 251 captured frames, so a
mismatch means something real — line noise, a desync, or a rule
we have wrong — and all three are worth hearing about.
The lenient Series III default is instructive: it hid the fact
that the documented checksum rule was wrong for two days. Set
False only to get a field diagnosis unstuck.
"""
self._transport = transport
self._recv_timeout = recv_timeout
self._strict = strict_checksums
self._parser = MicromateFrameParser()
self._pending: list[MicromateFrame] = []
# ── Identity and state ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def poll(self) -> MicromateFrame:
"""`0x5B` → `0xA4`. Handshake; carries the ID block and model string.
Every captured session opens with this and nothing before it.
"""
return self._exchange(SUB_POLL)
def read_serial(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x15` → `0xEA`. ASCII, null-terminated — e.g. `UM12947`."""
return self._read(SUB_SERIAL)
def read_device_info(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x01` → `0xFE`. Firmware, calibration, per-channel float block.
⚠ THOR never sends this in any captured session, so the `0xFFFF` offset
is from our own 2026-09-23 probes rather than from THOR's behaviour. It
answered correctly on both firmware lines, but it is the one read here
with no THOR frame behind it.
"""
return self._read(SUB_DEVICE_INFO)
def read_state(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x49` → `0xB6`. A cheap monitoring check; 16 B.
⚠ Test `data[11]` for **non-zero**, never against a constant — it has
read both `0x0E` and `0x0C` while monitoring.
"""
return self._read(SUB_STATE)
def read_monitor_status(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x1C` → `0xE3`. Flag, **device clock**, battery, memory.
⚠ Parse **forward** from the declared length, never backward from the
end. This block is 4 bytes longer on the Thor firmware line, and Series
III's relative-to-end offsets yield a battery voltage of 577.92 V on a
`11.0BD` unit.
"""
return self._read(SUB_MONITOR_STATUS)
def read_storage_range(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x06` → `0xF9`. Event storage extent; 47 B."""
return self._read(SUB_STORAGE_RANGE)
def read_event_index(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x08` → `0xF7`. 101 B. Contents not yet mapped."""
return self._read(SUB_EVENT_INDEX)
def read_trigger_config(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x2E` → `0xD1`. 39 B. Series IV only; no Series III equivalent."""
return self._read(SUB_TRIGGER_CONFIG)
def read_compliance_config(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x1A` → `0xE5`. The whole active setup — 2103 B on UM12947.
One response. Series III needs a 4-frame sequence for the same thing.
"""
return self._read(SUB_COMPLIANCE_CONFIG)
def read_call_home_config(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x2C` → `0xD3`. 137 B — Series III's is 124, so do not reuse its map."""
return self._read(SUB_CALL_HOME_CONFIG)
# ── Setups ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def read_active_setup_name(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x41` → `0xBE`. 266 B; carries the active `.MMB` name."""
return self._read(SUB_SETUP_ACTIVE)
def read_first_setup(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x3F` → `0xC0`. Head of the setup-file list."""
return self._read(SUB_SETUP_FIRST)
def read_next_setup(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x40` → `0xBF`. Repeat until the record carries an empty name.
Stateful: the device holds the cursor, so the same request walks the
list. 22 of these appear back to back in one captured session.
"""
return self._read(SUB_SETUP_NEXT)
# ── Event chain ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def arm_event(self) -> MicromateFrame:
"""`0x93` → `0x6C`. THOR sends this before **every** `1E`/`1F`.
It replaces Series III's `1E(token=0xFE)` arming step. No params, no
offset payload — an 11-byte ack.
⚠ Whether a unit actually requires it is untested. Do it because it is
known-good, not because it is known-necessary.
"""
return self._exchange(SUB_ARM_EVENT, offset=READ_ALL)
def read_event_first(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x1E` → `0xE1`. First event key + size; 19 B."""
return self._read(SUB_EVENT_FIRST, params=token_params())
def read_event_next(self) -> bytes:
"""`0x1F` → `0xE0`. Next key + size, or the all-zero null sentinel."""
return self._read(SUB_EVENT_NEXT, params=token_params())
def read_event_record(self, key4: bytes) -> bytes:
"""`0x0C` → `0xF3`. 221 B — project, client, operator, timestamp, peaks.
⚠ The peak float in here runs 2–5% above `max(T,V,L)` and is **not** the
vector sum; its offset was inferred, not established. Prefer decoded
samples.
"""
return self._read(SUB_EVENT_RECORD, params=key_params(key4))
def read_monitor_log_next(self, key4: bytes) -> Optional[bytes]:
"""`0x0A` → `0xF5`. One monitor-log record, or None at end of list.
⚠ Not the keyed single read the spec describes. This is a **walk**:
the same request repeated, the device advancing its own cursor, each
response a 297-byte record carrying serial, mode and thresholds. The
list ends with a bare 11-byte ack — nine captured frames, eight records
then the terminator.
Series III reaches the same data through a record-type discriminator on
its event walk (`0x2C` partial vs `0x46` full). Here it is a separate
cursor and the event chain does not see it at all.
"""
data = self._read(SUB_MONITOR_LOG, params=key_lo_params(key4))
return None if len(data) <= ACK_DATA_LEN else data
# ── Bulk download ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def read_event_file(self, key4: bytes, size: int) -> bytes:
"""`0x5A` → `0xA5`. The `.IDFW`/`.IDFH` file, byte for byte.
`size` is the 4 bytes after the key in the `1E`/`1F` response. Returns
exactly that many bytes, or raises `ShortRead`.
A bounded chunk walk — `ceil(size / 1024)` requests, each asking for
`min(1024, remaining)` bytes:
offset = the byte count wanted (NOT an address)
params = the key on chunk 0, then a uint16 BE byte offset
response = exactly `offset + 11` bytes; file bytes are data[11:]
Verified against THOR on all six bench events (4,076 → 13,424 B):
`sum(offsets) == size` exactly, every time.
⚠ Do not port the Series III `5A` walk. Its address arithmetic caused a
5x over-read and a `>64 KB` page-boundary bug that is *still open* on
that side. Neither applies here — the cursor is a byte offset into the
file, bounded by a size the device supplied, so it cannot run past the
event.
The result feeds `micromate.idf_file.read_idf_file()` and
`/db/import/idf_file` unchanged; no new codec work is needed.
"""
if size <= 0:
raise ValueError(f"size must be positive, got {size}")
out = bytearray()
n_chunks = math.ceil(size / CHUNK_SIZE)
for i in range(n_chunks):
want = min(CHUNK_SIZE, size - i * CHUNK_SIZE)
data = self._read(
SUB_BULK_DOWNLOAD,
offset=want,
params=chunk_params(key4, i * CHUNK_SIZE),
)
if len(data) < _CHUNK_PREFIX:
raise ShortRead(
f"chunk {i + 1}/{n_chunks} of {key4.hex()}: "
f"{len(data)} B is too short to hold a chunk header"
)
body = data[_CHUNK_PREFIX:]
if len(body) != want:
# Worth being loud: a silently short event is the failure mode
# this project has been bitten by repeatedly on the Series III
# side, and here the expected length is known up front.
raise ShortRead(
f"chunk {i + 1}/{n_chunks} of {key4.hex()}: asked for "
f"{want} B, got {len(body)}"
)
out += body
if len(out) != size:
raise ShortRead(
f"{key4.hex()}: assembled {len(out)} B, device promised {size}"
)
log.debug("downloaded %s: %d B in %d chunks", key4.hex(), len(out), n_chunks)
return bytes(out)
# ── Plumbing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _read(
self,
sub: int,
*,
params: bytes = bytes(10),
offset: Optional[int] = None,
timeout: Optional[float] = None,
) -> bytes:
"""Send one read command, return the response's data section."""
return self._exchange(sub, params=params, offset=offset, timeout=timeout).data
def _exchange(
self,
sub: int,
*,
params: bytes = bytes(10),
offset: Optional[int] = None,
timeout: Optional[float] = None,
) -> MicromateFrame:
if offset is None:
offset = _OFFSETS.get(sub, READ_ALL)
# Start every exchange clean: drop any half-frame and any frame left
# stashed by the last one. This is a strict request/response protocol,
# so anything already buffered when we send is by definition stale, and
# `expected_sub` would reject it anyway — better to discard it here than
# to raise a confusing UnexpectedResponse one command later.
self._parser.reset()
self._pending.clear()
self._send(build_request(sub, offset, params))
return self._recv_one(expected_sub=0xFF - sub, timeout=timeout,
reset_parser=False)
def _send(self, frame: bytes) -> None:
log.debug("TX %d bytes: %s", len(frame), frame.hex())
self._transport.write(frame)
def _recv_one(
self,
expected_sub: Optional[int] = None,
timeout: Optional[float] = None,
reset_parser: bool = True,
) -> MicromateFrame:
"""Read until one complete frame is parsed."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + (timeout or self._recv_timeout)
if reset_parser:
self._parser.reset()
self._pending.clear()
if self._pending:
return self._validate(self._pending.pop(0), expected_sub)
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
chunk = self._transport.read(4096)
if not chunk:
time.sleep(0.005)
continue
log.debug("RX %d bytes", len(chunk))
frames = self._parser.feed(chunk)
if frames:
self._pending.extend(frames[1:])
return self._validate(frames[0], expected_sub)
raise TimeoutError(
f"no frame in {timeout or self._recv_timeout:.1f}s"
+ (f" (expected SUB 0x{expected_sub:02X})" if expected_sub is not None else "")
+ f"; {self._parser.bytes_fed} bytes were received"
# That byte count is the whole point: it separates "nothing came
# back at all" from "bytes arrived but never framed", and those have
# completely different causes. It earned its keep on Series III.
)
def _validate(
self, frame: MicromateFrame, expected_sub: Optional[int]
) -> MicromateFrame:
if not frame.checksum_valid:
msg = (
f"SUB 0x{frame.sub:02X}: checksum mismatch "
f"(got 0x{frame.chk_byte:02X}, {len(frame.data)} B data)"
)
if self._strict:
raise ChecksumError(msg)
log.warning("%s — continuing (strict_checksums=False)", msg)
if expected_sub is not None and frame.sub != expected_sub:
raise UnexpectedResponse(
f"expected SUB 0x{expected_sub:02X}, got 0x{frame.sub:02X}"
)
return frame
+31 -10
View File
@@ -22,10 +22,30 @@ One rule covers both directions: after the leading doubled `BW_CMD`, every
escapes literal `0x03` bytes in write data so they are not mistaken for ETX,
exactly as Blastware does.
That rule was chosen by evidence, not assumption: of the four candidates tried
against the 9-24-26 capture's four data-carrying write frames, it is the only
one under which all four checksums validate. See
`docs/micromate_protocol_reference.md` → *The write path*.
A Micromate escapes exactly four byte values — `0x02 0x03 0x04 0x10` — and
nothing else, which is what makes the uniform rule exact rather than merely
convenient. Established by re-stuffing all 502 captured frames and comparing
to the wire: 251/251 each direction, where `{0x10}` alone gets 130 and 177.
⚠ Checksum, corrected 2026-09-27
--------------------------------
With uniform destuffing the checksum is **plain SUM8 of the destuffed
payload**. This script used to try SUM8 *and* a "DLE-aware" variant that
excludes `0x10` bytes, and report whichever matched — which is why it never
flagged a bad frame and why the protocol reference carried the wrong rule for
two days. The DLE-aware form belongs with *Series III* destuffing, where an
escaped byte survives as two bytes; applying it after uniform destuffing
subtracts the correction twice and disagrees with the wire on 55 of 251
responses.
The lesson generalises: a tool that accepts any of N candidate rules cannot
falsify any of them. It now validates against SUM8 alone, and reports
`DLE-aware` only to name what a mismatch *would* have been — never as a pass.
See `docs/micromate_protocol_reference.md` → *Checksum*, and
`tests/test_micromate_framing.py`, which pins it.
`micromate/framing.py` is the production implementation; this stays as the
one-shot capture-inspection tool.
Usage
-----
@@ -119,12 +139,13 @@ def frames(blob: bytes, *, is_request: bool):
except ValueError:
i += 1
continue
sum8 = sum(payload) & 0xFF
dle_aware = (sum(b for b in payload if b != DLE) & 0xFF)
if sum8 == chk:
kind = "SUM8"
elif dle_aware == chk:
kind = "DLE-aware"
# SUM8 of the destuffed payload is THE rule -- 502/502 captured frames.
# The DLE-aware variant is reported only to name a near-miss; it is
# never a pass. See the module docstring.
if (sum(payload) & 0xFF) == chk:
kind = "ok"
elif (sum(b for b in payload if b != DLE) & 0xFF) == chk:
kind = "BAD(dle-aware)"
else:
kind = "BAD"
yield i, payload, chk, kind
+493
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,493 @@
"""Client-layer tests for the Micromate (series-4) live client.
Every response constant below is a **real data section**, captured from UM12947
(firmware 11.0CB) in ``bridges/captures/9-24-26 - micromate2/``. They are
embedded as hex because the captures are gitignored.
Where a decoded value can be checked against something outside the bytes, it is:
the device clock against the capture's own filename timestamp, the battery
against Thor's event reports (3.8 V), the setup list against what the unit
displays.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import datetime
import os
import sys
import pytest
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
from micromate.client import CONTENT, MicromateClient, _content, _cstring
from micromate.framing import ETX, STX, checksum, stuff
from micromate.protocol import ProtocolError
FLAGS_CB, FLAGS_THOR = 0xC5, 0x03
# ── Captured response data sections ───────────────────────────────────────────
# Generated from the captures by hand-free extraction -- the hex below is
# verbatim response data, not reconstructed. The trailing comment on each
# names the capture it came from, which is what lets the clock assertions be
# checked against a wall-clock timestamp.
POLL = bytes.fromhex( # 59 B, from_20260924_185113_
"300000000000000000000000000050496e7374616e74656c"
"000600c3f04a00e4194f0074024d4d2f495345452f532f49"
"4f00001f603e7657603e76"
)
SERIAL = bytes.fromhex( # 21 B, from_20260924_191214_
"0a00000000000000000000554d3132393437003100"
)
STATE_IDLE = bytes.fromhex( # 16 B, from_20260924_191214_
"050000000000000000000000e8000b00"
)
STATE_MONITORING = bytes.fromhex( # 16 B, from_20260924_191214_
"050000000000000000000002e8000b00"
)
MS_MONITORING = bytes.fromhex( # 55 B, from_20260924_191214_
"2c00000000000000000000000e180907ea20130c19000000"
"000001000000000000000000000000000000000000017c00"
"e4e1c000e3f1c0"
)
MS_IDLE = bytes.fromhex( # 55 B, from_20260924_191214_
"2c000000000000000000000000180907ea64130d22000000"
"000001000000000000000000000000000000000000017c00"
"e4e1c000e3e1c0"
)
MS_LATE = bytes.fromhex( # 55 B, from_20260925_011403_
"2c000000000000000000000000190907ea74010e05000000"
"000001000000000000000000000000000000000000017c00"
"e4e1c000e3e1c0"
)
# ── Real 11.0BD bytes (UM20147, captured over USB 2026-09-30) ─────────────────
#
# The Thor firmware line, which was pure inference until this capture. These
# are the two responses where BD differs from CB. Captured with
# `mm_client_check.py --capture` and read out of the resulting pair with
# scratch/mm_frame_parse.py, so the data sections are verbatim; only the frame
# wrapper is rebuilt, and the framing is independently verified 251/251.
POLL_BD = bytes.fromhex( # 59 B -- flags 0x03, and the SHORTER model string
"30000000000000000000000000005649"
"6e7374616e74656c000600c3f04a00e4"
"194f0052024d4d2f495345452f530058"
"f406001f60c0755760c075"
)
MS_BD_MONITORING = bytes.fromhex( # 59 B -- FOUR BYTES LONGER than CB's 55
"3000000000000000000000000e1e0907"
"ea600e00310000000000000000000000"
"00000000000000000000000000015e00"
"e4e1c000e291c00fa00004"
)
_SETUP_PAD = 266 - CONTENT
def setup_response(name: str) -> bytes:
"""A 0x41/0x3F/0x40 response: 11-byte prefix then a null-padded name."""
body = name.encode("ascii").ljust(_SETUP_PAD, b"\x00")
return bytes([0xFF]) + bytes(10) + body
# The real 22 names, in the order the unit walked them.
SETUP_NAMES = [
"factory.MMB", "TEST.MMB", "BUS TEST.MMB", "Walsh JV 241.mmb",
"Walsh JV 008.mmb", "Hawbaker 322.mmb", "Hawbaker 322 blasting.mmb",
"min.mmb", "Playhouse Loc 1.mmb", "Valley Rock Solution.MMB",
"RecordingSetup.mmb", "UPMC.mmb", "UPMC Loc 3.mmb", "Residence Inn.mmb",
"Micromate ext trigger.mmb", "Micromate remort alarm.mmb",
"Tree of Life - Loc 1 - 5861 Solway.mmb", "Mele-PWSA-Carroll -Loc 4.mmb",
"Micromate min trigger mmb.mmb", "Fay - Layton Bridge Project.mmb",
"Default Micromate ISEE.mmb", "TEST1.mmb",
]
# ── Test doubles ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class ScriptedTransport:
def __init__(self, responses: list[bytes]) -> None:
self.queue = list(responses)
self.written: list[bytes] = []
self._connected = False
def connect(self) -> None:
self._connected = True
def disconnect(self) -> None:
self._connected = False
def is_connected(self) -> bool:
return self._connected
def write(self, data: bytes) -> None:
self.written.append(data)
def read(self, n: int) -> bytes:
return self.queue.pop(0) if self.queue else b""
def frame(rsp_sub: int, data: bytes, *, flags: int = FLAGS_CB) -> bytes:
payload = bytes([0x00, flags, rsp_sub, 0x00, 0x00]) + data
return bytes([STX]) + stuff(payload + bytes([checksum(payload)])) + bytes([ETX])
def client(responses: list[bytes], **kw) -> tuple[MicromateClient, ScriptedTransport]:
t = ScriptedTransport(responses)
return MicromateClient(t, recv_timeout=0.5, **kw), t
# ── The captured constants are what we think they are ─────────────────────────
def test_captured_constants_have_the_expected_lengths():
assert len(POLL) == 59
assert len(SERIAL) == 21
assert len(STATE_IDLE) == len(STATE_MONITORING) == 16
assert len(MS_MONITORING) == len(MS_IDLE) == len(MS_LATE) == 55
def test_the_prefix_length_byte_is_only_the_low_byte():
"""⚠ data[0] is `content_length & 0xFF`, with no high byte anywhere.
True for every response under 256 bytes, which is why it reads as a working
length field -- and then loses 2,048 bytes on a setup block. The client
takes content as data[11:] for exactly this reason.
"""
for data in (POLL, SERIAL, STATE_IDLE, MS_MONITORING):
assert data[0] == (len(data) - CONTENT) & 0xFF
assert data[1] == 0x00, "no high byte is stored"
# The two that prove it is not a real length: a 2,092-byte setup block
# reports 44, and a 1,024-byte download chunk reports 0.
assert (2092 & 0xFF) == 44
assert (1024 & 0xFF) == 0
# ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_printable_byte_precedes_the_manufacturer_string():
"""content[2] is 0x50 -- "P". This is why the POLL parse cannot be a scan."""
c = _content(POLL)
assert c[3] == 0x50 and chr(c[3]) == "P"
assert c[4:13] == b"Instantel"
def test_content_strips_exactly_eleven_bytes():
assert _content(SERIAL) == bytes.fromhex("554d3132393437003100")
assert _content(b"short") == b""
def test_cstring_stops_at_the_null():
assert _cstring(bytes.fromhex("554d3132393437003100")) == "UM12947"
assert _cstring(b"\x00rest") == ""
# ── connect() ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_connect_decodes_identity():
mm, t = client([
frame(0xA4, POLL), frame(0xEA, SERIAL), frame(0xB6, STATE_IDLE),
frame(0xBE, setup_response("TEST1.mmb")),
])
info = mm.connect()
assert info.serial == "UM12947"
assert info.manufacturer == "Instantel"
assert info.model == "MM/ISEE/S/IO"
assert info.firmware_line == "blastware"
assert info.monitoring is False
assert info.active_setup == "TEST1.mmb"
assert "UM12947" in str(info) and "idle" in str(info)
def test_connect_sends_three_reads_not_thors_four():
"""⚠ Deliberately narrower than Thor's POLL -> SERIAL -> 0x49 -> POLL.
The trailing POLL repeats the first; measuring all 8 captured sessions
showed the four-command form is Thor's connection check (3 of 8 sessions),
not a handshake. Only "opens with POLL" is invariant.
"""
mm, t = client([
frame(0xA4, POLL), frame(0xEA, SERIAL), frame(0xB6, STATE_IDLE),
frame(0xBE, setup_response("TEST1.mmb")),
])
mm.connect()
subs = [w[5] for w in t.written] # payload[2] lands at wire[5]
assert subs == [0x5B, 0x15, 0x49, 0x41]
assert 0x01 not in subs, "device info has no Thor precedent; do not read it"
def test_connect_can_skip_the_active_setup():
mm, t = client([frame(0xA4, POLL), frame(0xEA, SERIAL), frame(0xB6, STATE_IDLE)])
info = mm.connect(with_active_setup=False)
assert info.active_setup is None
assert len(t.written) == 3
def test_connect_survives_an_unreadable_active_setup():
"""A unit with no setup loaded is a real state, not a failed connect."""
mm, _ = client([
frame(0xA4, POLL), frame(0xEA, SERIAL), frame(0xB6, STATE_IDLE),
frame(0x00, bytes(20)), # wrong SUB -> UnexpectedResponse
])
info = mm.connect()
assert info.serial == "UM12947"
assert info.active_setup is None
def test_connect_reports_a_monitoring_unit():
mm, _ = client([
frame(0xA4, POLL), frame(0xEA, SERIAL), frame(0xB6, STATE_MONITORING),
frame(0xBE, setup_response("TEST1.mmb")),
])
assert mm.connect().monitoring is True
def test_the_state_flag_is_tested_for_non_zero():
"""⚠ Never compared against 0x02 -- this flag family is not a stable enum.
Its sibling in SUB 0x1C has read both 0x0E and 0x0C while monitoring.
"""
for value in (0x01, 0x02, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xFF):
data = bytearray(STATE_IDLE)
data[CONTENT] = value
mm, _ = client([
frame(0xA4, POLL), frame(0xEA, SERIAL), frame(0xB6, bytes(data)),
frame(0xBE, setup_response("x.mmb")),
])
assert mm.connect().monitoring is True, f"0x{value:02x} should read as monitoring"
def test_the_model_string_is_anchored_on_MM_not_on_an_offset():
"""The Thor firmware line reports a SHORTER model string, "MM/ISEE/S".
Anchoring on b"MM/" survives that; a fixed end offset would not. A generic
printable-run scan fails for a different reason -- see _parse_poll.
✅ CONFIRMED on real hardware 2026-09-30: UM20147 (11.0BD) read back
model="MM/ISEE/S" over USB. The frame below is still synthesised because
no BD capture is in the repo, but the string it asserts is the real one.
"""
bd = bytearray(POLL)
assert bd[CONTENT + 26:CONTENT + 38] == b"MM/ISEE/S/IO"
bd[CONTENT + 26:CONTENT + 38] = b"MM/ISEE/S\x00\x00\x00"
mm, _ = client([
frame(0xA4, bytes(bd), flags=FLAGS_THOR), frame(0xEA, SERIAL),
frame(0xB6, STATE_IDLE), frame(0xBE, setup_response("x.mmb")),
])
info = mm.connect()
assert info.model == "MM/ISEE/S"
assert info.manufacturer == "Instantel"
assert info.firmware_line == "thor"
# ── get_state() ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"data, monitoring, when, free",
[
(MS_MONITORING, True, datetime.datetime(2026, 9, 24, 19, 12, 25), 0x00E3F1C0),
(MS_IDLE, False, datetime.datetime(2026, 9, 24, 19, 13, 34), 0x00E3E1C0),
(MS_LATE, False, datetime.datetime(2026, 9, 25, 1, 14, 5), 0x00E3E1C0),
],
ids=["monitoring", "idle", "after-midnight"],
)
def test_get_state_decodes_the_real_reads(data, monitoring, when, free):
"""⚠ There is an unidentified byte at content[6]; the hour is at content[7].
The protocol reference's 0x1C section has this right. Its one-line summary
in the divergences list reads as six contiguous fields and does not.
Each expected time is checked against the capture filename that produced the
bytes: 19:12:14, 19:12:14 and 01:14:03. All three decode to seconds-to-a-
minute after their session opened, which is what a device clock should do.
Reading content[6] as the hour gives 32, 100 and 116.
"""
mm, _ = client([frame(0xE3, data)])
st = mm.get_state()
assert st.monitoring is monitoring
assert st.device_time == when
assert st.battery_volts == 3.80 # Thor's reports print 3.8 V
assert st.memory_total_bytes == 15_000_000
assert st.memory_free_bytes == free
assert st.raw == data
def test_content_6_is_not_the_hour():
"""The byte the reference implies is the hour reads 32, 100 and 116."""
for data in (MS_MONITORING, MS_IDLE, MS_LATE):
assert _content(data)[6] not in range(24)
def test_memory_derivations():
mm, _ = client([frame(0xE3, MS_MONITORING)])
st = mm.get_state()
assert st.memory_used_bytes == 15_000_000 - 0x00E3F1C0
assert 0 < st.memory_used_fraction < 0.02
assert "3.80 V" in str(st)
def test_battery_and_memory_are_read_forward_from_content_start():
"""⚠ NOT backward from the end.
This block is 4 bytes longer on the Thor firmware line, and Series III's
from-the-end offsets give a 11.0BD unit a battery reading of 577.92 V. The
extra bytes are trailing, so appending four does not move anything.
"""
bd = MS_MONITORING + bytes.fromhex("0fa00000")
bd = bytes([0x30]) + bd[1:] # low-byte length becomes 48
mm, _ = client([frame(0xE3, bd)])
st = mm.get_state()
assert st.battery_volts == 3.80, "forward offsets must survive the 4 extra bytes"
assert st.memory_total_bytes == 15_000_000
# What the Series III from-the-end offsets would have produced:
assert int.from_bytes(bd[-10:-8], "big") / 100 == pytest.approx(577.92, abs=0.01)
def test_a_dead_clock_battery_does_not_fail_the_whole_read():
"""An impossible date is information; the rest of the block is still good."""
broken = bytearray(MS_MONITORING)
broken[CONTENT + 3] = 0xFF # month 255
mm, _ = client([frame(0xE3, bytes(broken))])
st = mm.get_state()
assert st.device_time is None
assert st.battery_volts == 3.80
def test_a_truncated_state_block_raises():
mm, _ = client([frame(0xE3, bytes(20))])
with pytest.raises(ProtocolError, match="need at least 44"):
mm.get_state()
# ── Setups ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_list_setups_walks_to_the_empty_terminator():
"""22 real names then an empty one, exactly as the unit walked them."""
responses = [frame(0xC0, setup_response(SETUP_NAMES[0]))]
responses += [frame(0xBF, setup_response(n)) for n in SETUP_NAMES[1:]]
responses += [frame(0xBF, setup_response(""))]
mm, t = client(responses)
assert mm.list_setups() == SETUP_NAMES
assert len(t.written) == 23, "22 names plus the terminator"
assert t.written[0][5] == 0x3F
assert {w[5] for w in t.written[1:]} == {0x40}
def test_list_setups_handles_an_empty_unit():
mm, _ = client([frame(0xC0, setup_response(""))])
assert mm.list_setups() == []
def test_list_setups_refuses_to_loop_forever():
"""A cursor that never advances is a bug, and must not hang the caller."""
from micromate import client as C
mm, _ = client([frame(0xC0, setup_response("a.mmb"))]
+ [frame(0xBF, setup_response("a.mmb"))] * (C._MAX_SETUPS + 5))
with pytest.raises(ProtocolError, match="not advancing"):
mm.list_setups()
def test_get_active_setup_handles_a_long_name():
long_name = "Tree of Life - Loc 1 - 5861 Solway.mmb"
mm, _ = client([frame(0xBE, setup_response(long_name))])
assert mm.get_active_setup() == long_name
# ── Lifecycle ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_the_client_owns_the_transport():
mm, t = client([])
assert not mm.is_open()
mm.open()
assert mm.is_open() and t.is_connected()
mm.close()
assert not mm.is_open()
def test_context_manager_opens_and_closes():
t = ScriptedTransport([frame(0xA4, POLL), frame(0xEA, SERIAL),
frame(0xB6, STATE_IDLE), frame(0xBE, setup_response("x.mmb"))])
with MicromateClient(t, recv_timeout=0.5) as mm:
assert t.is_connected()
assert mm.connect().serial == "UM12947"
assert not t.is_connected()
# ── The Thor firmware line, on real bytes ─────────────────────────────────────
def test_bd_constants_have_the_lengths_the_parser_reported():
assert len(POLL_BD) == 59
assert len(MS_BD_MONITORING) == 59, "CB is 55; BD is four bytes longer"
assert MS_BD_MONITORING[0] == 0x30, "low-byte length 48 = 59 - 11"
assert MS_IDLE[0] == 0x2C, "the CB equivalent declares 44"
def test_connect_on_a_thor_line_unit():
"""UM20147, real POLL bytes. flags 0x03 is ETX, so it arrives as `10 03`."""
mm, _ = client([
frame(0xA4, POLL_BD, flags=FLAGS_THOR), frame(0xEA, SERIAL),
frame(0xB6, STATE_MONITORING), frame(0xBE, setup_response("test2.MMB")),
])
info = mm.connect()
assert info.firmware_line == "thor"
assert info.model == "MM/ISEE/S", "the BD model string is shorter than CB's"
assert info.manufacturer == "Instantel"
assert info.monitoring is True
def test_poll_content_3_is_not_a_constant():
"""⚠ 0x50 on UM12947, 0x56 on UM20147 -- it VARIES between units.
This is why the manufacturer is read at the fixed offset content[4] and not
by scanning: content[3] is printable in both cases ("P" and "V"), so a
printable-run scan would return "PInstantel" on one unit and "VInstantel" on
the other. Whatever the byte is, it is not a stable marker to anchor on.
"""
assert _content(POLL)[3] == 0x50
assert _content(POLL_BD)[3] == 0x56
assert chr(_content(POLL_BD)[3]) == "V"
def test_get_state_on_a_thor_line_unit():
"""⚠ THE test for the forward-offset decision. Real UM20147 bytes.
The 0x1C block is four bytes longer here, and the extras are TRAILING, so
offsets measured from the start of content are unmoved. Series III reads
battery and memory from the END of this block; test_series_iii_offsets_...
below shows what that produces.
"""
mm, _ = client([frame(0xE3, MS_BD_MONITORING, flags=FLAGS_THOR)])
st = mm.get_state()
assert st.monitoring is True
assert st.device_time == datetime.datetime(2026, 9, 30, 14, 0, 49)
assert st.battery_volts == 3.50
assert st.memory_total_bytes == 15_000_000
assert st.memory_free_bytes == 14_848_448
def test_series_iii_from_the_end_offsets_give_577_volts_on_a_bd_unit():
"""The exact number the protocol reference warned about, now demonstrated.
577.92 V is not a plausible battery reading for anything, which is what
makes it a free self-check -- bridges/mm_client_check.py watches for it.
"""
assert int.from_bytes(MS_BD_MONITORING[-10:-8], "big") / 100 == 577.92
def test_the_four_extra_bd_bytes_are_not_all_zero():
"""⚠ The reference records them as `0f a0 00 00`; UM20147 sent `0f a0 00 04`.
Only the first two bytes look fixed. Nothing reads them, but a future
decoder must not treat the last one as padding.
"""
assert _content(MS_BD_MONITORING)[44:] == bytes.fromhex("0fa00004")
assert _content(MS_IDLE)[44:] == b"", "the CB block has no such tail"
+413
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,413 @@
"""Framing tests for the Micromate (series-4) live protocol.
Every constant below is a **real frame**, lifted from
``bridges/captures/9-24-26 - micromate2/`` (UM12947, firmware 11.0CB) or from
``scratch/fake_unit.py``, which preserves a POLL probe reply. Frames are
embedded as hex rather than read from disk because both ``bridges/captures/``
and ``tests/fixtures/`` are gitignored -- these tests must pass on a fresh
clone.
The few synthesised frames are marked ``SYNTH_`` and each says what it stands
in for and why a captured frame was not available.
Two of these tests exist because the first draft of
``docs/micromate_client_spec.md`` got the rule wrong, and both wrong rules
fail quietly -- a frame the unit ignores, or a checksum that reads as bad:
* ``test_builder_matches_thor_byte_for_byte`` -- the escape set. Escaping
only 0x10 (the series-3 rule) reproduces 161 of Thor's 218 read frames.
* ``test_checksum_is_plain_sum8_over_destuffed_payload`` -- the checksum.
The DLE-aware variant disagrees with the wire on 55 of 251 responses.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
from micromate.framing import (
ACK,
DLE,
ETX,
FLAGS_BLASTWARE,
FLAGS_THOR,
STX,
MicromateFrame,
MicromateFrameParser,
build_request,
checksum,
stuff,
unstuff,
)
# ── Captured response frames ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
# POLL probe reply, 19 B on the wire -- the shortest valid frame there is.
# Preserved in scratch/fake_unit.py, captured from UM12947 on 2026-09-24.
# Its payload[8:10] is 0x0030, the data length POLL then asks for.
RSP_POLL_PROBE = bytes.fromhex("0200c5a400000000000030000000000000009903")
# SUB 0x49 -> 0xB6, the cheap state read. Carries a literal 0x02, escaped.
RSP_STATE = bytes.fromhex("0200c5b6000005000000000000000000001002e8000b007503")
# SUB 0x48 -> 0xB7, a path-addressed file read. offset_hi 0x04 arrives escaped,
# so page_hi is only correct if the parser destuffs before indexing.
RSP_FILE_READ = bytes.fromhex("0200c5b70000100400000000000000010000000000018203")
# An 0x5A download chunk, 138 B on the wire. THE checksum case: its payload
# holds literal 0x10 bytes, so plain SUM8 (0xC1, correct) and the DLE-aware
# variant (0x91) disagree. Also holds a literal 0x41, which is NOT escaped.
RSP_CHUNK_WITH_DLE = bytes.fromhex(
"0200c5a500007000003400000000000000e3fd1f10020f0f0e2e1e1fd4f2d4c3d2f00f000"
"e003fe03fe200d6e2d12d2e1c4e101011d101f3d0f3e0f2efe23d2b2e3c0d3e0e2c4101e0"
"d4d3e21f1d311e202fe2e2f1e3f100210d201002ee2e22d2f2f0f30fd3f0101000f0111f1"
"ff01e011010011f0f1002b4d200e0f0302c4010020001fffedb2dc103"
)
# ── Captured request frames (Thor -> unit) ────────────────────────────────────
REQ_POLL = bytes.fromhex("41021010005b000030000000000000000000009b03")
REQ_SERIAL = bytes.fromhex("41021010001500000a000000000000000000002f03")
REQ_STATE = bytes.fromhex("41021010004900ffff000000000000000000005703")
REQ_COMPLIANCE = bytes.fromhex("41021010001a00ffff000000000000000000002803")
REQ_ARM_EVENT = bytes.fromhex("41021010009300ffff00000000000000000000a103")
# ⚠ The two frames that break a 0x10-only escaper.
# Scheduler enable: params[7] = 0x03, on the wire as `10 03`.
REQ_SCHED_ON = bytes.fromhex("41021010004700ffff00000000000000100300005803")
# Bulk download, first chunk of event 055d4a81: offset 0x0400 puts a literal
# 0x04 in offset_hi, on the wire as `10 04`. EVERY download frame needs this.
REQ_DOWNLOAD_CHUNK0 = bytes.fromhex(
"41021010005a00100400055d4a810000000000009b03"
)
# A later chunk of the same event: params[2:4] = 0x1000, doubled to `10 10`.
REQ_DOWNLOAD_CHUNK4 = bytes.fromhex(
"41021010005a0010040000001010000000000000007e03"
)
# ── Stuffing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_escape_set_is_exactly_four_bytes():
"""0x02, 0x03, 0x04 and 0x10 -- and nothing else.
ACK (0x41) in particular is NOT escaped; assuming it was reproduced only
196 of 251 captured responses.
"""
assert stuff(bytes([0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x10])) == bytes(
[DLE, 0x02, DLE, 0x03, DLE, 0x04, DLE, 0x10]
)
for b in (0x00, 0x01, 0x05, 0x41, 0xC5, 0xFF):
assert stuff(bytes([b])) == bytes([b]), f"0x{b:02x} must not be escaped"
def test_unstuff_is_uniform_with_no_inner_frame_carve_out():
"""`10 XX` -> `XX` for any XX -- the series-3 DLE+ETX exception is absent."""
assert unstuff(bytes.fromhex("1003")) == b"\x03"
assert unstuff(bytes.fromhex("1010")) == b"\x10"
assert unstuff(bytes.fromhex("001002ff")) == bytes.fromhex("0002ff")
def test_stuff_unstuff_round_trips_over_every_byte_value():
data = bytes(range(256))
assert unstuff(stuff(data)) == data
def test_a_trailing_dle_is_held_not_dropped():
"""A DLE as the last byte of a chunk must not consume nothing and vanish."""
assert unstuff(b"\xff\x10") == b"\xff\x10"
# ── Checksum ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_checksum_is_plain_sum8_over_destuffed_payload():
"""⚠ Plain SUM8 -- do NOT exclude 0x10 bytes.
RSP_CHUNK_WITH_DLE is a real frame whose payload holds literal 0x10 bytes.
The wire says 0xC1; plain SUM8 gives 0xC1 and the DLE-aware variant used by
series-3 `5A`/write frames gives 0x91. 55 of 251 captured responses
disagree the same way.
"""
payload = unstuff(RSP_CHUNK_WITH_DLE[1:-1])[:-1]
chk_on_wire = unstuff(RSP_CHUNK_WITH_DLE[1:-1])[-1]
assert DLE in payload, "this frame is only interesting if it holds a 0x10"
assert checksum(payload) == chk_on_wire == 0xC1
assert (sum(b for b in payload if b != DLE) & 0xFF) == 0x91 # the wrong rule
def test_every_captured_frame_validates():
parser = MicromateFrameParser()
frames = parser.feed(
RSP_POLL_PROBE + RSP_STATE + RSP_FILE_READ + RSP_CHUNK_WITH_DLE
)
assert len(frames) == 4
assert all(f.checksum_valid for f in frames)
# ── Request builder ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"wire, sub, offset, params",
[
(REQ_POLL, 0x5B, 0x0030, bytes(10)),
(REQ_SERIAL, 0x15, 0x000A, bytes(10)),
(REQ_STATE, 0x49, 0xFFFF, bytes(10)),
(REQ_COMPLIANCE, 0x1A, 0xFFFF, bytes(10)),
(REQ_ARM_EVENT, 0x93, 0xFFFF, bytes(10)),
(REQ_SCHED_ON, 0x47, 0xFFFF, bytes.fromhex("00000000000000030000")),
(REQ_DOWNLOAD_CHUNK0, 0x5A, 0x0400, bytes.fromhex("055d4a81000000000000")),
(REQ_DOWNLOAD_CHUNK4, 0x5A, 0x0400, bytes.fromhex("00001000000000000000")),
],
ids="poll serial state compliance arm sched_on dl_chunk0 dl_chunk4".split(),
)
def test_builder_matches_thor_byte_for_byte(wire, sub, offset, params):
assert build_request(sub, offset, params) == wire
def test_a_0x10_in_params_needs_no_special_handling():
"""The spec's one open question. Thor sends it; the wire doubles it."""
frame = build_request(0x5A, 0x0400, bytes.fromhex("00001000000000000000"))
assert bytes([DLE, DLE]) in frame
assert frame == REQ_DOWNLOAD_CHUNK4
def test_builder_rejects_malformed_arguments():
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
build_request(0x5B, 0, bytes(9))
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
build_request(0x5B, 0x10000)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
build_request(0x100)
# ── Parsing ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_poll_probe_reply_fields():
(f,) = MicromateFrameParser().feed(RSP_POLL_PROBE)
assert f.sub == 0xA4
assert f.request_sub == 0x5B
assert f.flags == FLAGS_BLASTWARE
assert f.firmware_line == "blastware"
assert f.checksum_valid
assert f.probe_length == 0x0030
def test_probe_length_is_a_uint16_not_a_byte():
"""⚠ Read as data[3] alone, SUB 0x1A's 0x082C (2092) reads as 44 -- 47x low.
SYNTHESISED: no probe response survives in the captures on disk (the
9-24-26 session uses single-step reads at offset 0xFFFF throughout, so it
contains no probes at all). The field position is taken from the captured
POLL probe reply above, which does exercise it for real.
"""
payload = bytes([0x00, FLAGS_BLASTWARE, 0xE5, 0x00, 0x00]) + bytes(
[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x2C]
)
synth = bytes([STX]) + stuff(payload + bytes([checksum(payload)])) + bytes([ETX])
(f,) = MicromateFrameParser().feed(synth)
assert f.probe_length == 0x082C == 2092
assert f.data[3] == 0x08, "the high byte is where a byte-wide read loses 2048"
def test_escaped_bytes_land_in_the_right_field():
"""RSP_FILE_READ's first data byte is 0x04, which arrives as `10 04`.
Without destuffing it reads as 0x10 and every field after it is one byte
late -- the failure mode that put `SUB 0x02` in the log as `SUB_10` for an
afternoon.
"""
(f,) = MicromateFrameParser().feed(RSP_FILE_READ)
assert f.sub == 0xB7
assert f.request_sub == 0x48
assert (f.page_hi, f.page_lo) == (0x00, 0x00)
assert f.data[0] == 0x04
assert len(f.data) == 15, "one byte shorter than the wire suggests"
assert f.checksum_valid
# The real 11.0BD POLL data section, UM20147 over USB 2026-09-30. This
# replaces a synthesised frame -- the Thor firmware line was inference-only
# until this capture.
_POLL_BD_DATA = bytes.fromhex(
"30000000000000000000000000005649"
"6e7374616e74656c000600c3f04a00e4"
"194f0052024d4d2f495345452f530058"
"f406001f60c0755760c075"
)
def test_thor_firmware_line_survives_destuffing():
"""⚠ flags = 0x03 is ETX, so it arrives as `10 03`.
A parser that does not destuff ends the frame at byte 2 on half the fleet.
The data section is REAL (UM20147, 11.0BD); the frame wrapper is rebuilt,
which is sound because the framing is verified 251/251 elsewhere in this
file. scratch/mm_frame_parse.py reported payload=64 for this frame, and
the assertion below pins that, so the reconstruction is checked rather than
assumed.
"""
payload = bytes([0x00, FLAGS_THOR, 0xA4, 0x00, 0x00]) + _POLL_BD_DATA
assert len(payload) == 64, "the parser reported payload=64 for this frame"
wire = bytes([STX]) + stuff(payload + bytes([checksum(payload)])) + bytes([ETX])
assert bytes([DLE, ETX]) in wire, "flags 0x03 must be escaped on the wire"
(f,) = MicromateFrameParser().feed(wire)
assert f.flags == FLAGS_THOR
assert f.firmware_line == "thor"
assert f.sub == 0xA4
assert f.request_sub == 0x5B
assert f.checksum_valid
assert b"MM/ISEE/S\x00" in f.data, "the shorter BD model string"
def test_an_escaped_checksum_byte_is_read_correctly():
"""SYNTHESISED, but the behaviour is real: three captured responses have a
checksum of 0x02/0x03/0x04 and all three escape it on the wire. The
shortest is 1,070 B (an 0x5A chunk in
raw_s3_20260925_011403_Download_events_then_delete_1_event.bin, chk = 0x03),
too long to embed for one byte's worth of assertion.
"""
payload = bytes([0x00, FLAGS_BLASTWARE, 0xA4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03])
assert checksum(payload) == 0x03 + FLAGS_BLASTWARE + 0xA4 & 0xFF
body = payload + bytes([checksum(payload)])
synth = bytes([STX]) + stuff(body) + bytes([ETX])
(f,) = MicromateFrameParser().feed(synth)
assert f.chk_byte == checksum(payload)
assert f.checksum_valid
def test_a_corrupted_checksum_still_yields_a_frame():
"""Flag it, do not swallow it -- a dropped frame looks like a dead unit."""
broken = bytearray(RSP_POLL_PROBE)
broken[-2] ^= 0xFF
(f,) = MicromateFrameParser().feed(bytes(broken))
assert f.sub == 0xA4
assert not f.checksum_valid
def test_a_truncated_frame_yields_nothing():
parser = MicromateFrameParser()
assert parser.feed(RSP_POLL_PROBE[:-1]) == []
assert parser.frames == []
assert parser.bytes_fed == len(RSP_POLL_PROBE) - 1
def test_a_frame_too_short_to_hold_a_header_is_rejected():
assert MicromateFrameParser().feed(bytes([STX, 0x00, 0xC5, 0xA4, ETX])) == []
def test_request_frames_are_not_mistaken_for_responses():
"""Feeding a bidirectional capture must yield only the unit's side."""
parser = MicromateFrameParser()
frames = parser.feed(REQ_POLL + RSP_POLL_PROBE + REQ_SERIAL)
assert len(frames) == 1
assert frames[0].request_sub == 0x5B
def test_leading_noise_is_discarded():
"""Cold-boot banners and the RV55's RING/CONNECT chatter precede frames."""
noise = b"\r\nRING\r\n\r\nCONNECT\r\n" + bytes([ACK])
(f,) = MicromateFrameParser().feed(noise + RSP_POLL_PROBE)
assert f.sub == 0xA4
assert f.checksum_valid
def test_frames_split_across_feeds_reassemble():
"""The transport hands over whatever the socket returned, DLE pairs and all."""
whole = RSP_STATE + RSP_CHUNK_WITH_DLE
for cut in (1, 2, 5, 17, 24, 25, 40, len(RSP_STATE), len(whole) - 1):
parser = MicromateFrameParser()
got = parser.feed(whole[:cut]) + parser.feed(whole[cut:])
assert len(got) == 2, f"split at {cut} lost a frame"
assert all(f.checksum_valid for f in got), f"split at {cut} broke a checksum"
def test_reset_clears_partial_state():
parser = MicromateFrameParser()
parser.feed(RSP_POLL_PROBE[:6])
parser.reset()
assert parser.bytes_fed == 0
(f,) = parser.feed(RSP_POLL_PROBE)
assert f.checksum_valid
def test_firmware_line_of_an_unknown_flags_byte():
f = MicromateFrame(sub=0xA4, flags=0x99, page_hi=0, page_lo=0,
data=b"", checksum_valid=True)
assert f.firmware_line == "unknown"
assert f.probe_length is None
# ── Whole-session round trip ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
_CAPTURES = (
Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
/ "bridges" / "captures" / "9-24-26 - micromate2"
)
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not _CAPTURES.is_dir(),
reason="capture directory is gitignored; present only on a dev box",
)
def test_whole_captured_sessions_parse_with_no_bad_checksums():
"""Belt-and-braces against the real bytes when they happen to be here.
scratch/mm_frame_parse.py reported zero bad checksums on these sessions
only because it accepts a frame matching *either* checksum rule. This
asserts the single rule holds across all of them.
"""
total = 0
for path in sorted(_CAPTURES.rglob("raw_s3_*.bin")):
parser = MicromateFrameParser()
frames = parser.feed(path.read_bytes())
assert frames, f"{path.name}: no frames parsed"
bad = [f for f in frames if not f.checksum_valid]
assert not bad, f"{path.name}: {len(bad)} bad checksums"
total += len(frames)
assert total == 251, f"expected 251 response frames across the corpus, got {total}"
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not _CAPTURES.is_dir(),
reason="capture directory is gitignored; present only on a dev box",
)
def test_builder_reproduces_every_captured_read_frame():
"""218/218. This is the test that would have caught the escape-set error."""
checked = 0
for path in sorted(_CAPTURES.rglob("raw_bw_*.bin")):
blob = path.read_bytes()
i = 0
while i < len(blob):
if not (blob[i] == ACK and i + 1 < len(blob) and blob[i + 1] == STX):
i += 1
continue
j = i + 2
body = bytearray()
while j < len(blob):
if blob[j] == DLE and j + 1 < len(blob):
body.append(blob[j + 1])
j += 2
continue
if blob[j] == ETX:
break
body.append(blob[j])
j += 1
payload = bytes(body[:-1])
if len(payload) == 16: # a read frame; writes carry a data section
sub = payload[2]
offset = (payload[4] << 8) | payload[5]
assert build_request(sub, offset, payload[6:16]) == blob[i:j + 1], (
f"{path.name} @0x{i:04x} SUB=0x{sub:02x} offset=0x{offset:04x}"
)
checked += 1
i = j + 1
assert checked == 218, f"expected 218 read frames, checked {checked}"
+402
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
"""Protocol-layer tests for the Micromate (series-4) live client.
The load-bearing assertion in here is not "our parser understands the device" —
it is **"the bytes we put on the wire are the bytes THOR puts on the wire."**
Every request constant below is lifted from
``bridges/captures/9-24-26 - micromate2/`` (UM12947, firmware 11.0CB), so a
passing test means a real unit has already answered exactly that frame.
Responses are replayed through a scripted transport. No hardware, no network.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
from micromate import protocol as P
from micromate.framing import ETX, STX, checksum, stuff
from micromate.protocol import (
ACK_DATA_LEN,
ChecksumError,
MicromateProtocol,
ShortRead,
UnexpectedResponse,
chunk_params,
key_lo_params,
key_params,
token_params,
)
FLAGS_CB = 0xC5
# ── Test doubles ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class ScriptedTransport:
"""Hands back queued responses; records every byte written."""
def __init__(self, responses: list[bytes] | None = None) -> None:
self.queue = list(responses or [])
self.written: list[bytes] = []
self._connected = True
# BaseTransport surface actually used by MicromateProtocol
def connect(self) -> None:
self._connected = True
def disconnect(self) -> None:
self._connected = False
def is_connected(self) -> bool:
return self._connected
def write(self, data: bytes) -> None:
self.written.append(data)
def read(self, n: int) -> bytes:
return self.queue.pop(0) if self.queue else b""
def frame(rsp_sub: int, data: bytes, *, flags: int = FLAGS_CB, page: int = 0) -> bytes:
"""Build a response frame the way a unit would."""
payload = bytes([0x00, flags, rsp_sub, (page >> 8) & 0xFF, page & 0xFF]) + data
return bytes([STX]) + stuff(payload + bytes([checksum(payload)])) + bytes([ETX])
def ack(rsp_sub: int) -> bytes:
return frame(rsp_sub, bytes(ACK_DATA_LEN))
def proto(responses: list[bytes], **kw) -> tuple[MicromateProtocol, ScriptedTransport]:
t = ScriptedTransport(responses)
return MicromateProtocol(t, recv_timeout=0.5, **kw), t
# ── Captured THOR request frames ──────────────────────────────────────────────
REQ = {
"poll": bytes.fromhex("41021010005b000030000000000000000000009b03"),
"serial": bytes.fromhex("41021010001500000a000000000000000000002f03"),
"state": bytes.fromhex("41021010004900ffff000000000000000000005703"),
"compliance": bytes.fromhex("41021010001a00ffff000000000000000000002803"),
"arm": bytes.fromhex("41021010009300ffff00000000000000000000a103"),
"setup_first": bytes.fromhex("41021010003f00ffff000000000000000000004d03"),
"setup_next": bytes.fromhex("41021010004000ffff000000000000000000004e03"),
}
# The complete 0x5A sequence for event 055d4a81 (4,076 bytes → 4 chunks), as
# THOR sent it. Chunk 1's params hold a literal 0x04 and chunk 3's offset is
# the exact remainder.
REQ_CHUNKS_4A81 = [
bytes.fromhex("41021010005a00100400055d4a810000000000009b03"),
bytes.fromhex("41021010005a0010040000001004000000000000007203"),
bytes.fromhex("41021010005a00100400000008000000000000007603"),
bytes.fromhex("41021010005a001003ec00000c000000000000006503"),
]
SIZE_4A81 = 4076
# ── Params builders ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_event_token_sits_at_params_7():
"""⚠ THOR sends 0xFE here; the protocol reference documents all-zero params.
That reference entry describes our own browse probing, not THOR's.
"""
assert token_params() == bytes.fromhex("00000000000000fe0000")
def test_event_record_takes_the_full_key_at_params_4():
assert key_params(bytes.fromhex("055d4a81")) == bytes.fromhex("00000000055d4a810000")
def test_monitor_log_takes_only_the_low_half_of_the_key():
"""⚠ Inferred from one key value -- see key_lo_params' docstring."""
assert key_lo_params(bytes.fromhex("055d4a81")) == bytes.fromhex("0000000000004a810000")
def test_chunk_params_switch_from_key_to_byte_offset():
key = bytes.fromhex("055d4a81")
assert chunk_params(key, 0) == bytes.fromhex("055d4a81000000000000")
assert chunk_params(key, 1024) == bytes.fromhex("00000400000000000000")
assert chunk_params(key, 13312) == bytes.fromhex("00003400000000000000")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad", [b"", b"\x01\x02\x03", b"\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05"])
def test_params_builders_reject_a_wrong_length_key(bad):
for fn in (key_params, key_lo_params):
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
fn(bad)
# ── Each read emits the frame THOR emits ──────────────────────────────────────
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"name, method, rsp_sub, data_len",
[
("poll", "poll", 0xA4, 59),
("serial", "read_serial", 0xEA, 21),
("state", "read_state", 0xB6, 16),
("compliance", "read_compliance_config", 0xE5, 2103),
("setup_first", "read_first_setup", 0xC0, 266),
("setup_next", "read_next_setup", 0xBF, 266),
],
)
def test_reads_match_thors_wire_bytes(name, method, rsp_sub, data_len):
p, t = proto([frame(rsp_sub, bytes(data_len))])
getattr(p, method)()
assert t.written == [REQ[name]]
def test_arm_event_matches_thors_wire_bytes():
p, t = proto([ack(0x6C)])
p.arm_event()
assert t.written == [REQ["arm"]]
def test_poll_is_the_only_read_with_a_non_ffff_offset_besides_serial():
"""Reads are single-step at 0xFFFF; POLL and SERIAL are the exceptions."""
assert set(P._OFFSETS) == {P.SUB_POLL, P.SUB_SERIAL}
assert P._OFFSETS[P.SUB_POLL] == 0x0030
assert P._OFFSETS[P.SUB_SERIAL] == 0x000A
# ── The chunk walk ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_download_reproduces_thors_chunk_sequence_byte_for_byte():
"""The whole point of step 2. Four chunks, 4,076 bytes, THOR's exact frames."""
payload = bytes(range(256)) * 16 # 4096 B, we use the first 4076
payload = payload[:SIZE_4A81]
responses = []
for i in range(4):
want = min(P.CHUNK_SIZE, SIZE_4A81 - i * P.CHUNK_SIZE)
body = payload[i * P.CHUNK_SIZE: i * P.CHUNK_SIZE + want]
responses.append(frame(0xA5, bytes(11) + body, page=want // 256))
p, t = proto(responses)
got = p.read_event_file(bytes.fromhex("055d4a81"), SIZE_4A81)
assert t.written == REQ_CHUNKS_4A81
assert got == payload
assert len(got) == SIZE_4A81
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size, n_chunks, last_offset",
[
(4076, 4, 0x03EC), (11032, 11, 0x0318), (11502, 12, 0x00EE),
(13424, 14, 0x0070), (8746, 9, 0x022A), (6092, 6, 0x03CC),
(1024, 1, 0x0400), (1, 1, 0x0001), (1025, 2, 0x0001),
],
)
def test_chunk_count_and_final_offset(size, n_chunks, last_offset):
"""The first six rows are the six bench events, with THOR's real offsets."""
responses = []
for i in range(n_chunks):
want = min(P.CHUNK_SIZE, size - i * P.CHUNK_SIZE)
responses.append(frame(0xA5, bytes(11) + bytes(want)))
p, t = proto(responses)
p.read_event_file(bytes.fromhex("055d4a81"), size)
assert len(t.written) == n_chunks
# offset is payload[4:5] of the request; recover it from the built frame
final = t.written[-1]
assert final[7:9] in (
bytes([last_offset >> 8, last_offset & 0xFF]),
# a 0x02/0x03/0x04/0x10 high byte arrives escaped, shifting the pair
bytes([0x10, last_offset >> 8]),
)
def test_a_short_chunk_raises_rather_than_truncating():
"""A silently short event is the failure mode this codebase keeps hitting."""
p, _ = proto([frame(0xA5, bytes(11) + bytes(900))]) # asked for 1024
with pytest.raises(ShortRead, match="asked for 1024 B, got 900"):
p.read_event_file(bytes.fromhex("055d4a81"), 1024)
def test_a_chunk_too_short_to_hold_its_header_raises():
p, _ = proto([frame(0xA5, bytes(4))])
with pytest.raises(ShortRead, match="too short to hold a chunk header"):
p.read_event_file(bytes.fromhex("055d4a81"), 1024)
def test_download_rejects_a_nonsense_size():
p, _ = proto([])
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
p.read_event_file(bytes.fromhex("055d4a81"), 0)
# ── The monitor-log walk ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_monitor_log_walk_ends_on_a_short_response():
"""⚠ Not a keyed read -- the same request repeated, device-side cursor.
Eight records then an 11-byte ack, which is what the capture shows.
"""
key = bytes.fromhex("055d4a81")
responses = [frame(0xF5, bytes(297)) for _ in range(8)] + [ack(0xF5)]
p, t = proto(responses)
records = []
while (rec := p.read_monitor_log_next(key)) is not None:
records.append(rec)
assert len(records) == 8
assert len(t.written) == 9
assert len(set(t.written)) == 1, "every request in the walk is identical"
# ── Error handling ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_a_bad_checksum_raises_by_default():
"""⚠ Deliberately stricter than the Series III sibling.
That one logs and continues because its parser cannot always tell an
inner-frame delimiter from a checksum byte. The Micromate rule is exact on
251/251 captured frames, so a mismatch here means something real.
"""
bad = bytearray(frame(0xA4, bytes(59)))
bad[-2] ^= 0xFF
p, _ = proto([bytes(bad)])
with pytest.raises(ChecksumError, match="checksum mismatch"):
p.poll()
def test_a_bad_checksum_can_be_downgraded_for_field_diagnosis():
bad = bytearray(frame(0xA4, bytes(59)))
bad[-2] ^= 0xFF
p, _ = proto([bytes(bad)], strict_checksums=False)
assert p.poll().sub == 0xA4
def test_the_wrong_response_sub_raises():
p, _ = proto([frame(0xE0, bytes(19))]) # 0xE0 answers 0x1F, not 0x1E
with pytest.raises(UnexpectedResponse, match="expected SUB 0xE1"):
p.read_event_first()
def test_a_timeout_reports_how_many_bytes_arrived():
"""Separates "nothing came back" from "bytes arrived but never framed".
Those have completely different causes -- and on a Micromate the second one
is the signature of a modem forwarding a session it should not be.
"""
p, _ = proto([])
with pytest.raises(P.TimeoutError, match="0 bytes were received"):
p.poll()
unframed = b"\x02\x00\xc5\xa4garbage-no-terminator"
p2, _ = proto([unframed])
with pytest.raises(P.TimeoutError, match=f"{len(unframed)} bytes were received"):
p2.poll()
def test_a_leftover_frame_is_discarded_rather_than_answered_with():
"""If a read returns two frames, the extra must not answer the NEXT request.
Every exchange resets the parser before sending, so anything already
buffered is treated as stale. Delivering it would be the worse failure:
`expected_sub` happens to catch a mismatched SUB, but a same-SUB leftover
would sail through and return data for the wrong key.
"""
# Both frames arrive while answering arm_event(); the 0xE1 is left over.
p, _ = proto([ack(0x6C) + frame(0xE1, b"\xaa" * 19)])
p.arm_event()
# The next request gets no bytes of its own, so it must time out rather
# than hand back the stale 0xE1.
with pytest.raises(P.TimeoutError):
p.read_event_first()
# ── Against the real capture, when it happens to be present ───────────────────
_CAPTURES = (
Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
/ "bridges" / "captures" / "9-24-26 - micromate2"
)
_DOWNLOAD = "raw_bw_20260925_011403_Download_events_then_delete_1_event.bin"
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not (_CAPTURES / _DOWNLOAD).is_file(),
reason="capture is gitignored; present only on a dev box",
)
def test_every_captured_download_frame_is_one_we_would_have_sent():
"""Replay the real session: for each event, assert our chunk walk emits
exactly the frames THOR emitted -- all 50-odd of them, six events."""
from micromate.framing import ACK, DLE
def destuffed_frames(blob: bytes, is_req: bool):
i, n = 0, len(blob)
while i < n:
if is_req:
if not (blob[i] == ACK and i + 1 < n and blob[i + 1] == STX):
i += 1
continue
j = i + 2
else:
if blob[i] != STX:
i += 1
continue
j = i + 1
out = bytearray()
while j < n:
if blob[j] == DLE and j + 1 < n:
out.append(blob[j + 1])
j += 2
continue
if blob[j] == ETX:
break
out.append(blob[j])
j += 1
if len(out) >= 6:
yield blob[i:j + 1], bytes(out[:-1])
i = j + 1
bw = list(destuffed_frames((_CAPTURES / _DOWNLOAD).read_bytes(), True))
s3 = list(
destuffed_frames(
(_CAPTURES / _DOWNLOAD.replace("raw_bw", "raw_s3")).read_bytes(), False
)
)
# Group THOR's 0x5A frames per event, taking each event's key+size from the
# 1E/1F that preceded them.
events, cur = [], None
for (wire, req), (_, rsp) in zip(bw, s3):
sub, data = req[2], rsp[5:]
if sub in (0x1E, 0x1F) and len(data) >= 19:
cur = {"key": data[11:15], "size": int.from_bytes(data[15:19], "big"),
"reqs": [], "rsps": []}
if cur["size"]:
events.append(cur)
elif sub == 0x5A and cur is not None:
cur["reqs"].append(wire)
cur["rsps"].append(rsp)
# The capture walks the chain twice (it deletes an event on the second
# pass), so some 1E/1F hits carry a size but no download behind them.
events = [e for e in events if e["reqs"]]
assert len(events) == 6, f"expected 6 downloaded events, found {len(events)}"
total = 0
for e in events:
p, t = proto([bytes([STX]) + stuff(r + bytes([checksum(r)])) + bytes([ETX])
for r in e["rsps"]])
got = p.read_event_file(e["key"], e["size"])
assert t.written == e["reqs"], (
f"event {e['key'].hex()}: our {len(t.written)} frames differ from "
f"THOR's {len(e['reqs'])}"
)
assert len(got) == e["size"]
total += len(e["reqs"])
assert total == 56, f"expected 56 download frames across the 6 events, saw {total}"