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terra-view/backend/operator_auth.py
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2026-06-17 19:19:36 +00:00

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Python

# backend/operator_auth.py
"""Operator authentication: the deny-by-default gate, session cookie, login +
lockout, and the small data helpers shared by the routes and the CLI. Reuses the
argon2 hasher (auth_passwords) and the HMAC signer (auth_cookies).
The flag and SessionLocal are read as module globals at call time so tests can
monkeypatch them."""
import os
import time
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from backend.models import OperatorUser
from backend.auth_passwords import hash_password, verify_password, generate_password
from backend.auth_cookies import sign, read, COOKIE_SECURE
# Feature flag — OFF by default. When off, the gate and require_role both pass
# everything through and the app behaves exactly as it does today.
OPERATOR_AUTH_ENABLED = os.getenv("OPERATOR_AUTH_ENABLED", "false").lower() in ("1", "true", "yes")
COOKIE_NAME = "tv_session"
COOKIE_MAX_AGE = 60 * 60 * 24 * 30 # 30 days ("remember this device")
MAX_LOGIN_FAILURES = 5
LOCK_MINUTES = 15
# Role ladder — a rank map so checks read naturally and 'operator' slots in later.
_ROLE_RANK = {"operator": 10, "admin": 20, "superadmin": 30}
# A throwaway hash used only to equalize verify time on the unknown-email path,
# so a missing account can't be distinguished from a wrong password by timing
# (no user-enumeration). The value never authenticates anything.
_DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH = hash_password("operator-auth-timing-equalizer")
def role_at_least(role: str, minimum: str) -> bool:
"""True iff `role` ranks at or above `minimum`. Unknown roles rank as 0."""
return _ROLE_RANK.get(role, 0) >= _ROLE_RANK[minimum]
def _norm_email(email: str) -> str:
return (email or "").strip().lower()
def make_operator_cookie(uid: str, iat: int = None) -> str:
"""Sign a tv_session value for a user id. iat defaults to now; pass an explicit
iat when you bump sessions_valid_from to that same instant (change-password)."""
return sign({"uid": uid, "iat": int(iat if iat is not None else time.time())})
def current_operator(request, db):
"""Resolve the OperatorUser for a request's tv_session cookie, or None.
Re-validated against the DB every call: a disabled / locked / password-changed
user drops on the next request. Used by the gate middleware (with its own
session) — does not raise."""
data = read(request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME), COOKIE_MAX_AGE)
if not data:
return None
uid, iat = data.get("uid"), data.get("iat")
if not uid or not isinstance(iat, (int, float)):
return None
user = db.query(OperatorUser).filter_by(id=uid).first()
if not user or not user.active:
return None
if user.locked_until and user.locked_until > datetime.utcnow():
return None
if user.sessions_valid_from and datetime.utcfromtimestamp(int(iat)) < user.sessions_valid_from:
return None
return user
def register_login_failure(db, user) -> None:
"""Increment a user's failure counter and lock them out past the threshold."""
user.failed_login_count = (user.failed_login_count or 0) + 1
if user.failed_login_count >= MAX_LOGIN_FAILURES:
user.locked_until = datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(minutes=LOCK_MINUTES)
db.commit()
def authenticate(db, email, password):
"""Return (user, "ok") on success, (None, "locked") if locked out, else
(None, "bad"). Never reveals whether the email exists: an unknown email runs
the same argon2 verify (against a dummy hash) as a wrong password, so neither
the response text nor its timing distinguishes the two."""
user = db.query(OperatorUser).filter_by(email=_norm_email(email)).first()
if user and user.locked_until and user.locked_until > datetime.utcnow():
return None, "locked"
password_ok = verify_password(password, user.password_hash if user else _DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH)
if not user or not user.active or not password_ok:
if user:
register_login_failure(db, user)
return None, "bad"
user.failed_login_count = 0
user.locked_until = None
user.last_login_at = datetime.utcnow()
db.commit()
return user, "ok"
def create_operator(db, email, name, role, password=None, must_change=None):
"""Create an operator. With no password, generate a temp one and force a change
(must_change defaults True). With a password, must_change defaults False.
Returns (user, raw_password_to_show_once). Raises ValueError on dup/bad role."""
email = _norm_email(email)
if role not in _ROLE_RANK:
raise ValueError(f"unknown role {role!r}")
if db.query(OperatorUser).filter_by(email=email).first():
raise ValueError(f"operator {email} already exists")
if password is None:
password = generate_password()
if must_change is None:
must_change = True
elif must_change is None:
must_change = False
user = OperatorUser(id=str(uuid.uuid4()), email=email, display_name=name,
password_hash=hash_password(password), role=role,
active=True, must_change_password=must_change)
db.add(user)
db.commit()
return user, password
def reset_operator_password(db, user) -> str:
"""Generate a fresh temp password, force a change, log the user out everywhere.
Returns the raw password to show once."""
raw = generate_password()
user.password_hash = hash_password(raw)
user.must_change_password = True
user.failed_login_count = 0
user.locked_until = None
user.sessions_valid_from = datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0)
db.commit()
return raw
def change_own_password(db, user, new_password) -> int:
"""Set a user's own new password, clear the forced-change flag, and bump
sessions_valid_from to the returned iat — the caller mints the replacement
cookie with that exact iat so it stays valid while older cookies die."""
new_iat = int(time.time())
user.password_hash = hash_password(new_password)
user.must_change_password = False
user.sessions_valid_from = datetime.utcfromtimestamp(new_iat)
db.commit()
return new_iat
def set_operator_active(db, user, active: bool):
user.active = bool(active)
db.commit()
return user
def set_operator_role(db, user, role: str):
if role not in _ROLE_RANK:
raise ValueError(f"unknown role {role!r}")
user.role = role
db.commit()
return user